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This paper examines the  investment allocation decisions of  pension plans, endowments, f oundations, and other 
institutional plan sponsors.  The experience and education of plan sponsors and the environment (both regulatory 
and agency) of the institutional market suggests that institutional investors rely less on past performance and use 
different criteria when evaluating performance compared to mutual fund investors.  Institutional investors are 
expected to be less concerned with total returns and more considerate of benchmark-adjusted excess returns, and the 
consistency with which they are delivered, over longer time horizons.  An examination of asset and account flows 
for actively-managed U.S. equity products is largely consistent with these expectations.  The consistency with which 
managers deliver positive or negative active returns relative to the S&P500 over multiple horizons, without regard to 
the magnitude of these returns, plays a key role in determining the flow of assets among investment products.  Style 
benchmarks play a larger role in determining account movements, which is found to employ more criteria than asset 
moves.  However, total return is also considered, as the magnitudes of a one-year loss and 3 and 5-year total returns 
are found to be incremental factors in plan sponsors’ allocation decisions.  One explanation for this result is the 
principal-agent arrangement faced by plan sponsors.  Although the sponsors may be more sophisticated than the 
typical retail investor, their clients, investors and the investment board, may not be.  Plan sponsors may minimize 
job risk by hiring and firing managers based on excess returns with incremental allocations based on total returns, 
thereby satisfying both their mandate and their clients.  It is also found that smaller and older products capture 











* Heisler, Knittel, and Stewart gratefully acknowledge support from the Boston University School of Management 
Junior Faculty Research Grant Program. The paper has benefited from the comments of Michael Salinger, Don 
Smith, participants at the Chicago Quantitative Alliance and Boston University finance seminar, and attendees of the 
2004 FMA and NBEA Conferences.  Heisler: Gottex Fund Management, Jeffrey.Heisler@GottexFunds.com. 
Knittel: Department of Economics, University of California at Davis and NBER, crknittel@ucdavis.edu.  Neumann: 
Department of Economics and Finance, St. John’s University Tobin College of Business, neumannj@stjohns.edu. 
Stewart: Department of Finance, Boston University School of Management, sstewart@bu.edu.  
  1 
I. Introduction 
 
Institutional plan sponsors, who allocate taxable corporate or tax-exempt endowment, 
pension, or foundation assets, have received little attention in the academic literature.
1  The 
behavior of these institutional investors, however, is important due to the size of the institutional 
market, the additional principal/agent relationship and the high level of investment savvy of plan 
sponsors.  As of December 2000, institutional equity and bond funds held total assets of $6,646 
billion compared to $4,770 billion for retail equity and bond mutual funds.  This suggests that it 
is important to understand these markets in order to understand asset prices.  Plan sponsor 
professionals have two sets of monitors, their superiors, in the form of an oversight committee, 
and the investors in the plan, including company shareholders, which expect the plan sponsor to 
make asset allocation decisions on their behalf.  Plan sponsors are typically professionals who 
possess knowledge of advanced techniques for evaluating manager skill and performance, or 
have access to consultants with this knowledge.  In many cases, the individual with ultimate 
responsibility for an institutional investment is the CEO, CFO or Treasurer of a company.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that plan sponsors at least match the level of sophistication 
and scrutiny of individual retail investors when choosing an asset manager.  
In contrast to institutional investor behavior, the behavior of retail investors has been 
studied extensively. This research largely focuses on the relationship between mutual fund 
performance, both prior and contemporaneous, and the flow of assets between funds.  The results 
suggest that while, on average, retail investors tend to direct money to mutual funds with positive 
short-term total returns
2 and positive short-term excess returns,
3 they are less likely to withdraw 
                                                                 
1 The exceptions being Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) [DT (2002)], and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). 
2 Gruber (1996) and Fant and O’Neal (2000) find a positive relationship between 1-year total return and asset flows, 
while Sirri and Tufano (1998) find a positive relationship with average 3 and 5-year annual total returns.  Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) find that funds in the top total return quintile in each of the preceding three years capture  
  2 
assets from funds with poor short-term performance.
4  In addition, older funds are found to grow 
their asset bases proportionately slower than younger funds.
5 
6 
This paper examines how measures of fund performance and fund attributes affect the 
allocation of new money and the reallocation of existing money among institutional investment 
products. In so doing, we make inferences about the extent to which plan sponsors and their 
consultants, assumed to possess  more financial understanding, rely on past performance and 
whether they use different criteria than retail investors, as suggested by the existing literature on 
retail investor behavior.  Since asset flows impact security prices, it is important for investors 
and economists to understand the process institutional investors follow in reallocating their 
assets.  These questions are important for the investment industry since most fund manager and 
fund company compensation, in the form of management fees, is based on the asset base 
managed.   
When examining the institutional market, the key decision is the hiring and firing of the 
plan sponsors.  This behavior may be studied by examining the flow of assets between products; 
however this is an imperfect measure  as asset flows do not necessarily indicate a hire/fire 
decision.  Further, asset flows can be distorted by a few large sponsors moving large amounts of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
incrementally higher flows, while Goetzmann and Peles (1997) find this result for funds in the top total return 
quintile. 
3 Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find a positive relationship between asset flows and 1and 2-year excess returns, while 
Barber, Odean and Zheng (2001) find a positive relationship with the two most recent 12-month periods. Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) find that funds in the top quintile ranks, based on 1-year excess returns, capture higher flows, while 
Ippolito (1992) finds a similar result for each of the three most recent years.  Using Jensen’s alpha Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) quintile ranks of 5-year capture higher flows and similar results for the trailing 5-year average a while Fant 
and O’Neal find over similar results over 3-year horizons. 
4 Ippolito (1992), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Fant and O’Neal (2000), and Barber, 
Odean, and Zheng (2001) find this asymmetric relationship. 
5 Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2001), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Chevalier and Ellison (1997). Only Fant and 
O’Neal (2000) find a positive relationship between asset flows and fund assets.  However, they measure flows 
differently, in real dollars rather than as a percentage of beginning-of-period nominal assets. 
6 Additional factors include fees and expense ratios, loads, the size of the family to which a fund belongs, and the 
amount of media coverage a fund receives.  See, for example, Warther (1995), Santini and Aber (1998), Sirri and 
Tufani (1998), Potter (2000), Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and Barber, Odean and Zheng (2002).  
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assets with a few hire/fire decisions, possibly based on criteria different from the average 
sponsor.  T herefore, both the flow of assets and  number of  accounts between products is 
examined. 
Anecdotal evidence, and the results of research on retail investors, suggest that historical 
performance, both total and excess, are important determinants in explaining asset flows between 
investment products.  Retail investors appear to focus on recent performance, suggesting that 
investors find mutual funds that have posted strong recent performance, or that have appeared in 
a “top ten” list, attractive.
7  Prudent man  rules, professionalism and the long-term nature of 
pension and foundation investment horizons all suggest that plan sponsors will resist the lure of 
short-term performance and incorporate a longer horizon track record into their screening 
process for selecting managers than retail investors.  In fact, since institutional investors should 
be well aware that past performance is not a good forecast of future performance, plan sponsors 
may consider historical returns only to a small degree.  To study this, we incorporate total and 
excess return factors over 3-year and 5-year horizons as well as the prior year’s total and excess 
returns.  The results suggest that 1-year loss and 3 and 5-year total returns are incremental factors 
in plan sponsors’ allocation decisions.
8  While institutional investors consider long-term returns 
in addition to short-term results and generally employ benchmarks in their evaluations, they can 
be swayed by total returns.  Unlike retail investors, however, institutional investors seem willing 
to withdraw assets from poorly performing managers. 
Excess return is typically calculated relative to broad market indexes such as the S&P500 
and CRSP value-weighted index in studies of retail investor behavior; however, this would 
                                                                 
7 The exception is Sirri and Tufano (1998) who examine average 1-year total returns and Jensen’s a over a 5-year 
horizon.  
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represent a very basic screen for institutional sponsors.  Most pension plans, endowments and 
foundations set broad asset target weights and hire specialist managers specifically for the 
investment style objective of the product.  The proper evaluation of the manager’s performance 
should then take into account the appropriate style benchmark and exposure to that benchmark.  
We examine four benchmarks: the S&P500 and three style benchmarks.  The first of these style 
benchmarks is based on the style reported by the investment manager offering the product.  The 
second is a simple style indicator based on the product’s correlation with Russell 1000 style 
indices over the preceding 24 quarters.  The Russell indexes are widely published and considered 
to be the most popular benchmark beyond the S&P500 for institutional domestic equity 
managers.  The third indicates not only the style, but also the product’s style exposure.  This 
measure would reflect the extremeness of manager style.  While it is expected that sponsors use 
style-exposure benchmarks, the results suggest they rely largely on the S&P 500 and a simple 
style indicator.  Investment style is considered in evaluating product performance, but not the 
degree of style exposure.  
Stewart (1998) shows that the consistency with which a manager generates active returns 
should be a prime criterion in the plan sponsor screening process.  Consistency is defined as the 
frequency, over short assessment periods within the evaluation period, with which the manager 
generates positive excess returns.  In general, institutional investors prefer more consistent 
performance because it increases the likelihood of good long-term results, provides lower noise 
levels versus plan targets, and makes it easier for sponsor professionals to report this 
performance to their superiors.  This suggests that the evaluation of performance is path 
dependent.  Investors differentiate two products that post identical active performance based on 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 DT (2002) find that plan sponsors direct assets towards funds with positive 1-year excess performance relative to 
the S&P500, but this reward is not based on the magnitude of that excess return.  In addition, managers are rewarded  
  5 
how this performance was achieved, where the product that generates lower annualized, but 
more stable, growth may be preferred.  This measure has not been incorporated into earlier 
studies and should also shed light on the relative importance of simply over or under performing 
the benchmark and the magnitude of over or under performance.  The results support the 
importance of return consistency.  The consistency with which managers deliver positive or 
negative active returns over multiple measurement horizons, without regard to the magnitude of 
these returns, plays a key role in determining the flow of assets among investment products. 
If sponsors are more comfortable with, and find it easier to justify the selection of, a 
manager with a longer and more-established track record, fund age should have a positive 
relationship with flows.  If plan sponsors value qualitative features, such as service and a 
personal relationship with their manager,  or believe the manager has a better chance of 
performing well with fewer assets, product size should have a negative relationship with flows.   
The results are consistent with these expectations.
9  If the investors expect relative out-
performance of one  manager relative to others to persist, one expects a positive relationship 
between current and lagged asset and account flows.  We find a p ositive and significant 
relationship for asset flows but a significant negative relationship for account flows.
10  One 
explanation for this negative relationship is regression to the mean.  An account gained can only 
be lost.  A manager that gains (loses) above average accounts regresses to the mean in the next 
period, producing a negative flows coefficient. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
for the size of the Jensen’s a generated over the preceding three years. 
9 DT (2002) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997), however, find a significant negative and non-significant relationship 
between product age and asset flows respectively. 
10 DT (2002) find a negative relationship between size and flows and marginal evidence of serial correlation, 
suggesting persistence in factors that drive positive performance, in their pension fund sample.  
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Overall, the level of performance appears to play only a marginal role in the hire/fire 
decision.
11  While plan sponsors appear to examine long horizon total returns in making hiring 
and firing decisions, the consistency with which managers deliver active returns over multiple 
measurement horizons appears to matter more.  Further, while institutional investors consider 
investment style in evaluating product performance, the degree of style exposure is not 
considered.  This raises the possibility of gaming by the fund managers, who are aware of their 
ability to manage their level of style exposure and that they are not being held accountable for 
this risk when evaluated by plan sponsors.
12 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the database and methodology, 
including the definitions of asset and account flows and style measures.  Section III presents the 
results.  Section IV concludes and outlines directions for future research. 
 
II.  Methodology 
A. Data 
The dataset of institutional managers and their products comes from the PSN Investment 
Manager Database compiled by Effron Enterprises Inc.  This database provides historical 
information on over 7000 investment products, including annual summary information about 
each product and quarterly assets under management and performance data.  This information is 
self-reported by the product managers. Product managers use the PSN file for performance 
comparison to their peers and by plan sponsors and consultants to identify candidate investment 
managers. 
                                                                 
11 The regression R
2 vary between 0.0629 and 0.0414, which is one-half to one-quarter of the R
2 found in 
regressions for mutual funds. 
12 Alternatively, this risk adjustment could be taking place using alternative or subjective methods, not captured by 
the model.  
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This paper focuses on active domestic equity funds.
13 These products constitute 
approximately 60% of the entire universe. While product performance information is available 
starting in 1979, assets under management figures are first available in 1984.  Therefore, new 
asset flows and products returns are calculated beginning in 1985, and the analysis of annual 
flow behavior begins in 1989 to allow for a five-year lagged return calculation. 
 
B. Model 
Plan sponsors hire and fire investment managers.  A direct measure of this decision 
would require knowledge of plan sponsors’ holdings; however, this information is unavailable.  
As a result, we proxy plan sponsors’ hire/fire decisions by the relative changes in assets under 
management and the number of client accounts invested in the products. 
The model estimates the relationship of asset and account flows to the product’s return, 
return consistency, and attributes: 
 
Asset Flowsi,t = f(St Returni,t-t, St Return Consistencyi,t-t, Attributesi,t-1) + ei,t 
Account Flowsi,t = g(St Returni,t-t, St Return Consistencyi,t-t, Attributesi,t-1) + ei,t 
 
The model is estimated using fixed-effects regression.  Though both the asset and account flows 
data are unbalanced panel sets, there still is the possibility of cross-sectional or serial correlation.  
The latter is the larger concern because if it exists, the multiple observations for an investment 
product over time are not independent.  Such correlation could arise from the overlap in the 
longer three-year and five-year return horizons, or from static structural features of the 
                                                                 
13 While domestic and global, active and passive equity funds were examined, results are reported for a sample of 
active domestic equity funds that also excludes smallcap products.  
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investment product.  The fixed-effects control for unobserved features of a particular fund that 





Asset flows are typically expressed as the change in assets adjusted for the return over the 
period of change: 
 
Dollar Flowsi,t = Assetsi,t – Assetsi,t-1(1 + Ri,t) 
 
or as the percentage change in assets relative to the product’s beginning of year assets: 
 
Percentage Flowsi, t  = 
1 - t i,
t i, 1 - t i, t i,
Assets
) R (1 Assets   -   Assets +
 
 
where Ri,t is the return of product i in year t.
14 
However, asset flows do not necessarily indicate a hire/fire decision.  Asset flows arise 
from normal-course-of-business withdrawals or deposits, net flows into the asset class in which a 
product lies, or net flows to a product’s style.  While one assumption could be that large net asset 
flows, in proportion to a product’s asset base, represents a hiring or firing decision, this requires 
a potentially arbitrary decision as to what represents a large change in assets.  Further, unless the 
                                                                 
14 This measure assumes that new assets flow into and out of products at the end of each year.  
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model controls for size this measure will suggest a negative relationship between size and 
flows.
15   
To address these issues an alternative measure of assets flows is developed.  We measure 
a product’s flows as the change in assets in proportion to all funds “on the move” within the 
industry that year.  Funds “on the move” is the sum of the absolute value of all products’ dollar 
flows in that year.  For a specific product, this measures the percentage of aggregate flow activity 
captured (or lost) by that product in that year.  Scaling flows in each year this way also removes 
the need to control for year-by-year differences in aggregate flows, eliminating the need for year-
style interaction variables. If there is a relationship between performance and flows, products 
with relatively better performance over some time horizon should capture a larger portion of the 
money entering the market or being reallocated by plan sponsors.  This measure of captured 
flows for a product i is: 
 




t j, 1 - t j, t j,
t i, 1 - t i, t i,
|   ) R (1   Assets    -   Assets   |




There remains a limitation with asset flows; a few large plan sponsors can distort the 
results, moving large amounts of assets with a few hire/fire decisions, possibly based on criteria 
different from the average sponsor.  Further, asset flows could also indicate a re-allocation, the 
decisions to move some, but not all, assets from one manager to another.  Since sponsors tend to 
                                                                 
15 A product with consistent performance year after year that attracts constant asset flows year after year will have 
declining percentage flows year after year.  Even a product with small increases in asset flows may exhibit declining 
percentage flows over time as the product’s asset base grows, creating the impression that the product is becoming 
less desirable as an investment.  
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hold only one account with each product, an alternative approach to measuring the hire/fire 
decision is to examine the change in the number of accounts held by each product.  While the 
PSN database contains information on the number of accounts for each product, changes in the 
number of accounts does not control for accounts gained from or lost to other product types. A 
product can gain (lose) an account from (to) a product within the equity market or from (to) a 
product outside of the equity market.  To address these issues, and to provide a perspective of 
scale relative to both the product and the equity industry, we first determine the number of 
accounts for the average equity product in the PSN database.  We then calculate the year-by-year 
change in the number of accounts for each individual equity product and  in the number of 
accounts for the average equity product.  A product’s account flows is the difference between the 
proportional change in the number of its client accounts and the proportional change in the 






















ws AccountFlo  
 
where A i,t is the number of accounts for product i at time t and A t is the average number of 
accounts per equity product at time t. 
 
Within Equity Subsample 
The change in an equity product’s account total consolidates accounts it gained (lost) 
from (to) both non-equity and equity products.  The year-to-year change in the average number 
of accounts per equity product, the accounts gained or lost by the average equity product, serves 
as a proxy for the accounts gained (lost) from (to) non-equity products by the equity market.  As  
  11 
such, the difference between a product’s account total change and the average equity product’s 
account total change can be interpreted as  the number of accounts gained (lost) by the product 
from (to) other equity products.  The “within equity” subsample consists of those observations 
where the account flow indicates that a product lost (gained) more accounts than the equity 
industry lost (gained), or lost (gained) accounts while the equity industry gained (lost) accounts.  
In other words, the cases where a sponsor fired one equity manager and hired a replacement 
equity manager.  
 
D. Product Return 
We measure product returns  five ways; the product’s total return, r i,t, excess return 
relative to the S&P 500, r i,t – r SP,t, and excess returns relative to a style-adjusted benchmark 
based on either the product’s self-reported style, ri,t – rSR,t, a style indicator variable, ri,t – rSI,t, or a 
style exposure variable, ri,t – rSE,t.  Style-adjusted returns are calculated using the Russell 1000 
Value and Russell 1000 Growth indexes.  We select these indexes based on their common use as 
benchmarks within the industry.  We include a test for an asymmetric reaction to positive and 
negative performance, modeled using an < 0 interaction dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the return difference between the product and benchmark is negative. 
  The product’s self-reported style is available in the PSN database; however, this 
information is only available for 2000.  Tests based on self-reported style, therefore, assume that 
products do not change investment styles over the sample period.
16  A self-reported value 
product is benchmarked to the Russell 1000 Value index, while a self-reported growth product is 
benchmarked to the Russell 1000 Growth index.  We benchmark all other products to the Russell 
1000 index.  
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To control for changing investment styles, potential style drift and a product’s style 
exposure, we develop two style measures: a style indicator variable and a style exposure 
variable. These style variables are based on the product’s sensitivity to the Russell 1000 Value 
and Russell 1000 Growth indexes as estimated from regressions using quarterly returns over the 
preceding six years, starting in 1979.  Products with fewer than 20 quarterly observations or with 
adjusted-r
2 less than 0.50 are discarded: 
Ri,t-1,t-24 =  ai  +  b G,iRRus1000G,t-1,t-24  +  b V,iRRus1000V,t-1,t-24  + ei,t-1,t-24 
 
Style Indicator 
The style indicator variable categorizes a product as simply growth, value or something 
in between.  If the growth index coefficient alone is significant, the product is designated as a 
growth product and assigned a style indicator of 0.  If the value index coefficient alone is 
significant the product is designated as a value product and assigned a style indicator of 1.  
Products where both c oefficients are significant are assigned an indicator between 0 and 1 
calculated as a weighted-average coefficient estimate: 
 
Style Indicatori,t =  
t i, G, t i, V,
, ,








The benchmark return, rSI,t, is the style indicator multiplied by the appropriate Russell 
1000 style index return.  Table 1 and Figure 1 report the number of products and distribution of 
style indicators for the rolling 6-year periods of the sample period. The sample size varies owing 
to the sample selection criteria and the growth of products over the sample period.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
16 This is the approach followed by DT (2002).  
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Approximately 50% to 70% of the products in any rolling period are categorized as growth or 
value styles.   
  Table 2 reports the distribution of style indicators categorized by the products’ self-
reported style, Panel A for self-reported growth and Panel B for self-reported value.  The results 
show that in 2000, 60.1% of self-reported growth products are identified as growth, assigned a 
style indicator of 0, and 63.5% are identified as growth oriented, assigned style indicators £ 0.4. 
In 2000, while only 45.7% of self-reported value products are identified as value, assigned a 
style indicator of 1, 75.0% are identified as value oriented, assigned style indicators ‡ 0.6.  This 
suggests that the style indicators provide an effective categorization of products based on style.  
  It also suggests that the self-reported styles may not always be an accurate indication of 
the product’s style.  The time series provides evidence of either style drift or Russell style index 
instability.  In particular, the years 1996-1997 show the highest percentage of self-reported 
growth products identified as growth (64.9% and 62.2% respectively) and the lowest percentage 
of self-reported value products identified as value (21.6% and 26.0% respectively).  This is 
consistent with the impression that while growth managers largely remained true to their 
mandate, value managers drifted toward the Russell growth index during a period that rewarded 
growth styles at the expense of value.  Assuming the plan sponsors are aware of this behavior, it 
suggests that it is necessary to include style indicators, not just self-reported style, when 
examining asset and account flows. 
 
Style Exposure 
While the style indicator provides a simple method for determining a product’s 
benchmark, it does not capture the product’s degree of style exposure based on the manager’s  
  14 
unique investment process.  If the growth index coefficient alone is significant, the product’s 
style exposure variable is the bivariate regression coefficient on the Russell 1000 Growth Index 
and the benchmark return is rSE,t =  bG,i,t rG,t.  If the value index coefficient alone is significant the 
product’s style exposure is the bivariate regression coefficient on the Russell 1000 Value Index 
and the benchmark return is r SE,t =  bV,i,t r V,t.  When both  bV,i,t and bG,i,t are significant and 
positive, the benchmark  return is calculated as the weighted average of the two Russell indexes, 
adjusted for the extremeness of a product’s position: 
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where t will either be the 1-year, 3-year, or 5-year average annual return on the index. 
Table 3 reports the distribution of style exposures categorized by the products’ self-
reported style -- Part A for self-reported growth, Part B for self-reported value, Parts C and D for 
all other products.  The results show that in 2000, 42.8% of self-reported growth products had 
style exposures between 0.5 and 1.0 (underexposure to the index) and 51.7% overexposure.  In 
2000, 5 0.5%  of self-reported value products had style exposures between 0.5 and 1.0 
(underexposure to the index) and 40.2%, overexposure.  The style exposures vary considerably 
over the sample period suggesting that it is necessary to include style exposure when examining 
asset and account flows. 
 
E. Return Consistency 
A standard measure of performance consistency is tracking error.  We calculate this as 
the natural log of the annualized standard deviation of quarterly excess returns relative to the 
S&P 500 over the preceding 5 years.  
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A second measure tracks the “path” of excess performance over the 5-year, 3-year and 1-
year horizons relative to the S&P 500 and the style-adjusted benchmarks.  Each path is defined 
by whether the product outperformed the benchmark over the return horizon.  For example, path 
1 indicates that the product achieved positive excess return over the 5-year, 3-year and 1-year 
return horizons, suggesting consistent positive excess over a 5-year evaluation period.  There are 
eight such paths and each path is parameterized as an indicator variable.  These variables are 
denoted: Benchmark-Path (5-year 3-year 1-year), that is, path 1 calculated relative to the S&P 
500 would be denoted SP500-1 (+++). 
 
Path  Excess Return  Description 
  5-year  3-year  1-year   
1  +  +  +  Consistently Positive  
2  +  +  -  Negative 1-year 
3  -  +  +  Positive 3-year 
4  +  -  +  Mixed 
5  -  +  -  Mixed 
6  +  -  -  Negative 3-year  
7  -  -  +  Positive 1-year 
8  -  -  -  Consistent Negative 
 
F. Product Attributes 
Since the product’s inception date is unknown, the first appearance in the database of a 
quarterly return or assets figure is used as a proxy for the product’s first year in existence.  
Dummy variables assign products to two groups: 0 to 10 years and > 10 years.  The > 10 years 
group follows Chevalier and Ellison (1997).   As reviewed earlier, our time criteria prevents us 
from testing shorter periods of time, even though we would expect significance solely for periods 
less than and greater than 3 or 5 year periods.  Product size is measured as the natural log of 
year-end assets under management, while lagged flows is measured as the previous years flow 
measure.  
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III. Results 
A. Asset Flows 
The number of products, amount of assets, and asset flows for the test sample of the PSN 
database are reported and compared in Table 4 and Figure 2.  Table 4 shows the steady growth 
and increase in flow activity within the industry since 1989.  The sample includes the majority of 
aggregate assets in the database for all years except 1989, reaching a maximum of 73.5% in the 
year 2000.  More importantly, while the sample represents approximately half of the inflows and 
outflows present in the database, the patterns of flows for the sample and the database (plotted in 
Figure 2) are highly correlated, suggesting that the sample is representative of the database. 
Table 5 reports the total number of products, average product net flow and standard 
deviation of net flow, and the average product excess return and standard deviation of excess 
return relative to the S&P 500 and self-reported style index over the 1, 3, and 5-year horizon.  
Figure 3 plots the average product net flow against excess return for the 1, 3 and 5-year horizons.  
The results suggest a strong but incomplete linkage between flows and excess return.  While 
flows largely track excess returns, there are years where this relationship is clearly not positive.  
This pattern is also observed in Table 6, which reports the average asset flow for products sorted 
into a two-dimensional matrix based on decile asset flows and decile excess return relative to the 
S&P 500.  Product excess return matters, the highest return decile products typically capture 
positive asset flows, however, this is not the only factor influencing assets flows. Three of the 
highest excess return deciles have negative asset flows on average and three of the lowest excess 
return deciles have positive asset flows on average for the 1, 3 and 5-year horizons.  In addition, 
the pattern of deciles with positive average asset flows is nearly identical across horizons.  
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To explore the relationship between product performance and asset flows further, we 
regress, using fixed effects least squares regression, captured asset flows on the product’s return, 
return consistency, and attributes relative to each benchmark (S&P 500, self-reported style, style 
indicator and style exposure).
17   
Panel A of Table 7 assumes that investors respond to continuous measures of returns.  
Consistent with the summary statistics, product return and attributes explain little in the variation 
of a fund’s asset flows.  The specification using S&P500 excess returns has adjusted-r
2 of 0.0462 
and a within-r
2 of 0.0469, while the specification using total returns has adjusted-r
2 of 0.0440 and 
within-r
2 of 0.0480.
18  Overall, this suggests that while plan sponsors consider product returns, 
return consistency and attributes when allocating assets among products, they rely largely on 
other factors, such as  qualitative judgments about the manager’s ability to earn superior 
performance, customer service, and/or their relationship with the manager. 
When considering  past performance, plan sponsors appear to consider both total and 
excess return over the 3-year and 5-year horizon.  All of the coefficient estimates on 3-year 
return variables are significant at the 1% level while the < 0 interaction terms are insignificant.  
Similarly, the 5-year total return and excess returns relative to self-reported style and the style 
indicator are positive and significant, and the < 0 interaction terms are  insignificant.  This 
implies that while products gain assets on average over the sample period, plan sponsors treat 
positive and negative returns symmetrically; products with positive (negative) returns over the 
preceding 3 and 5-year horizons  gain (lose)  incremental assets, with sponsors being equally 
                                                                 
17 We report the results only for the sample excluding products self-reported as “Index Passive,” “Global”, or small-
cap.  We exclude these products to provide a more homogeneous sample in terms of plan sponsor selection criteria 
and return benchmarks.  Indexed products are not managed for excess return, global products seek to outperform 
global or international benchmarks, and small-cap products are not benchmarked to the large-cap S&P500 and 
Russell 1000 indices.  The inclusion of any or all of these products does not qualitatively change the results. 
18 The 5-year total < 0 interaction term is dropped as only 2 of the 8,515 (6,969) observations in the asset (account) 
flows sample have negative 5-year total returns.  
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sensitive to  positive and negative returns.  It also appears that plan sponsors punish asset 
managers for delivering negative total return performance in the most recent year, as illustrated 
by a positive 1-year total return < 0 interaction term significant at the 1% level. 
Product attributes also appear to play a role in plan sponsors’ allocation decisions.  The 
relationship between product age and asset flows is negative and highly significant, suggesting 
that products older than 10 years capture incrementally more flows than younger products.  This 
finding is consistent with earlier studies that concluded products with longer track records were 
more attractive, having established themselves as satisfactory p erformers and prudent 
investments.  The coefficient on product size is also negative and highly significant at the 1% 
level across all specifications.  This suggests that a product’s size inhibits its ability to capture 
flows; all else equal, large products capture a smaller share of asset flows in a given year.  This 
finding agrees with the majority of the results in the literature and is consistent with the 
interpretation that larger products are viewed less favorably in terms of qualitative factors that 
influence allocation decisions, or the belief that larger products may face a bigger challenge to 
deliver superior performance.  It may also be due to successful products closing to new assets.  
Lagged captured flow is positive and significant.
19  This result agrees with DT (2002) who find 
marginal evidence of serial correlation in their pension fund sample and is consistent with 
regular contributions by institutional plans to existing investment products made independent of 
performance as part of an established relationship with the manager. 
Panel B of Table 7 replaces the continuous measures of performance with discrete 
measures of return consistency.  Path-4 (+-+) is omitted, and while reported in its logical location 
                                                                 
19 The coefficient on lagged asset flows is not significant when passive index and global products are included in the 
sample. Assuming index products capture a steady flow of net assets from sponsors pursuing an index strategy, this 
may seem counterintuitive.  However, when investment styles are performing well, they capture relatively more  
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in table for ease of comparison, is estimated as the constant.  The relationship between product 
attributes and asset flows remain essentially unchanged from Table 7A.  The results in Table 7B 
suggest that the ability to deliver consistent positive excess returns, without consideration of the 
magnitude of the excess returns, matters.  A product that consistently produces positive 
(negative) benchmark-adjusted returns attracts significantly more (less) assets than it would if 
had a mixed performance record, regardless of the particular path.  The coefficients on Path-1 
(+++) are significant and positive for the S&P 500 and all style benchmarks, but not for total 
return.  Similarly, a product that consistently produces negative benchmark-adjusted returns, 
Path 8 (---), attracts fewer assets than i n years in which it outperforms the benchmark.  The 
coefficients are negative across all excess return benchmarks and significant for the S&P 500 and 
self-reported style.  These results suggest that, at some point in the manager selection or 
evaluation process, plan sponsors screen on positive active return over benchmark.  They reward 
managers who consistently beat benchmarks with additional assets and withdraw assets from 
managers who consistently trail the S&P 500 or a benchmark based on the self-reported style of 
the product. 
The coefficient on the volatility of excess return relative to the S&P500 is positive but 
insignificant across the models, except for the total return and style exposure specifications.  
While the positive sign suggests that more volatility is less of a drag on products’ ability to 
capture flows, the coefficient is largely insignificant in the tests reported in Tables 7B, 7C, 8, and 
9.  Its significance in Table 7B when total return paths are tested but found to be insignificant is 
likely signaling the importance of benchmark-based consistency which is revealed in the other 
asset flows tests. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
flows than index investments.  When investment styles are performing poorly, this reverses. This counter-cyclical 
effect washes out the significance of lagged asset flows when indexed products are present in the sample.  
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The significance of multiple excess return consistency coefficients in Table 7B and the 
correlation between different excess returns motivates a dditional testing to see if a more 
definitive statement can be made as to which benchmark is more prominently used by sponsors.  
Table 7C reports the results of four tests which simultaneously evaluate multiple return 
consistency paths.  The results suggest that the S&P 500 is a key benchmark in sponsor 
decisions.  The total return and style exposure paths are never significant while Path 1 (+++) and 
Path 8 (---) for the S&P 500 are always significant and only Path 1 is significant for the self-
reported style and style indicator-based benchmarks.  Products that consistently beat the S&P500 
attract incremental flows; those that consistently under-perform attract less or lose flows.  While 
there is incremental reward for managers who also consistently outperform a style-based 
benchmark, it does not appear as though consistent under-performance is punished or that there 
is an adjustment for the degree to which a manager pursues a particular style strategy. 
To further explore the relative importance of simply outperforming the benchmark as 
opposed to the magnitude of that out-performance, Table 8 reports coefficient estimates for the 
model that includes both continuous and discrete measures of performance.  The relationship 
between product attributes and asset flows remains essentially unchanged.  When total returns 
and total return consistency are tested together, the consistency coefficients remain insignificant, 
while the 1-year < 0 interaction term, 3-year, and 5-year total return coefficients all remain 
positive and significant.  Conversely, when excess returns and excess return consistency are 
tested together, the coefficients on the return consistency paths retain their sign and largely their 
significance, while the coefficients on excess return become insignificant, and in the case of the 
3-year excess return relative to the S&P 500 and style indicator, switch signs.  Since collinearity 
among independent variables can suppress significance, the persistent significance of the S&P  
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500 and style excess return consistency paths (Path 1) reinforces the suggestion that simply 
beating the benchmark is more important than the magnitude of the excess return.  This suggests 
that, at some point in the manager selection or evaluation process, plan sponsors screen on 
positive active return over benchmark without regard to the magnitude of excess return.  This 
screen apparently looks at active performance relative to both the S&P 500 and a Russell 1000 
style index based on products’ self-reported style. 
To explore the relative importance of total return relative to excess return in the 
allocation decision, Table 9 reports coefficient estimates for the full model that includes total and 
excess return, excess return consistency and product attribute variables.  The coefficients on 
excess return remain largely insignificant while the coefficients on the 1-year < 0 interaction 
term, 3-year, and 5-year total return variables continue to be positive and highly significant in all 
specifications.  This suggests that after controlling for return consistency and product attributes, 
plan sponsors appear to reward total return rather than excess return.  In addition, plan sponsors 
do not appear to distinguish between the degrees to which managers pursue style strategies, deep 
style or core style managers are not evaluated using different benchmarks, but rather use a 
common benchmark, the S&P 500, to screen on return consistency.  In addition, the adjusted and 
within-r
2 values are always greatest when the specification includes excess return and/or return 
consistency calculated using the S&P 500. 
Overall, the results suggest that while plan sponsors largely use other criteria, the 
attributes of the product and the ability of a manager to produce consistent excess returns, 
without regard to their magnitude, relative to the S&P500 are critical in capturing above average 
asset flows.  Consistent delivery of excess returns relative to a straightforward style benchmark 
also attracts incremental asset flows.  After controlling for return consistency and product  
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attributes, plan sponsors appear to reward extended horizon (3 and 5-year) total return rather than 
excess return, and punish near-term (1-year) losses.  One possible explanation for this result is 
the principal-agent arrangement faced by plan sponsors.  Although plan sponsors may be more 
sophisticated than the typical retail investor, their clients -- investors and the investment board -- 
may not be.  The hiring and firing of managers based on excess returns with incremental 
allocations based on total returns may be a way of satisfying both their mandate and their clients. 
 
B. Account Flows 
The sample examining account flows consists of 6969 product-year observations.
20  
Table 10 reports summary statistics for account flows for the equity sample and the within equity 
subsample.  The overall mean, and many of the annual means, is positive for the total sample and 
equity product sample, indicating that the industry gained accounts and the equity products 
examined gained a higher percentage of accounts than the industry on average. This suggests 
that, rather than playing a zero sum game, equity products were able to gain net accounts, 
possibly due to plan sponsors hiring additional managers as equity assets increased in value in 
the 1980’s and 90’s.  This gain may also be the result of more consistent reporting by products in 
the sample.  Since information is self-reported, products that have performed well, and likely 
gained assets and accounts, are more likely to report results and enter the sample. 
We report the results for both the total equity product sample and the “within equity” 
subsample.  We use the total sample to examine the factors that influence the hiring and firing 
decision relative to the average equity product; the subsample is used to draw inferences about 
                                                                 
20 The sample excludes index -passive, global and small-cap products; year 2000 observations and 26 outliers 
identified using DFITS, Cook's Distance, and Welsch Distance tests.  Nineteen observations where the 26 outliers 
resulted in a dependent variable becoming a lagged explanatory variable in the next year were also removed. 
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the criteria used by plan sponsors in making decisions that result in the replacement of one equity 
manager with another. 
Table 11A reports coefficient estimates for models that include return and attribute 
variables.  Consistent with the asset flow results, account flows within the industry are largely 
explained by factors other then product performance and attributes.  The model using the S&P 
500 benchmark excess returns explains the greatest variation in account flows, with an adjusted-
r
2 of 0.0527 and within-r
2 of 0.0786.  This suggests that plan sponsors largely consider other 
factors, such as qualitative predictors of superior performance, customer service and/or their 
relationship with the manager, when making the hiring and firing decisions. 
While products in the sample did better than the average equity product on average over 
the sample period, plan sponsors also appear to consider both total and excess returns over the 1 
and 3-year horizons.  The coefficient on the 1-year < 0 interaction term is positive and significant 
for all return variables (as opposed to total return  alone  using asset flows), indicating that 
products with poor 1-year performance gain fewer or lose more than the average number of 
accounts.  Products also appear to gain more or lose less than the average number of accounts for 
positive 3-year total and excess returns, as only the coefficient on excess return relative to the 
S&P 500 is not significant.  However, unlike asset flows the 3-year < 0 interaction  terms are 
negative and significant for excess returns relative to the self-reported, style indicator, and style 
exposure benchmarks.  This suggests an asymmetric relationship, with managers who deliver 
positive performance benefiting more than those who deliver negative performance are punished.  
Managers who underperform may lose assets, but not necessarily the entire account.  While the 
coefficients on 5-year excess returns are positive and significant for the S&P 500 and style  
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exposure benchmarks, the relationship between account flows and excess returns does not appear 
as strong over the 5-year horizon. 
As with asset flows, there is a strong relationship between account flows and product 
attributes.  The relationships between account flows and product size and product age are 
negative and highly significant.  The coefficient on lagged flows is negative and significant, 
whereas it was positive with asset flows.  This suggests that a manager who gained (lost) in 
terms of account flows in one period relative to the industry is subsequently more likely to lose 
(gain) in the next period.  This is likely due to regression to the mean rather then the plan 
sponsors engaging in a contrarian hire/fire rule.  Once an account is gained, it can only be lost.  
Products  that gain (lose) above average accounts regress to the mean in the next period, 
producing a negative flows coefficient. 
Table 11B reports coefficient estimates of the models that include return consistency and 
attribute variables.  Excess return consistency continues to be important; total return consistency 
does not.  The pattern of rewarding consistent positive excess returns (Path 1) and punishing 
consistent negative excess returns (Path 8) is not as strong as that observed with asset flows.  
Consistently underperforming the S&P500 and style indicator benchmark results in below 
average account flows relative to the average equity product, while consistently good 
performance relative to self-reported and style indicator benchmarks results in above average 
account flows.  Tracking error becomes more important as a measure of consistency.  The 
coefficient on tracking error is negative and significant, indicating that consistent returns, 
regardless of sign, are preferred when allocating accounts. 
Table 11C reports the results of simultaneously evaluating multiple return consistency 
measures.  As in Table 7C, consistency relative to the S&P 500 appears to be a key criteria  
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among plan sponsors while the total returns consistency coefficients are never significant.  The 
difference here is that there is no evidence that consistent benchmark out-performance (Path 1) 
results in better than average account flows.  There is evidence that products with consistent 
underperformance (Path 8), or mixed underperformance (Paths 5 and 7), do worse than the 
average equity product in terms of account flows.  Consistently beating a style benchmark based 
on either the self-reported or effective style indicator (Path 1) results in incremental account 
flows (as it did asset flows), while there is no evidence that plan sponsors incorporate style 
exposure when determining style benchmarks. 
Table 12 reports coefficient estimates for the model specifications that include both 
continuous and discrete measures of performance along with product attribute variables.  The 
signs and significance of the total return, self-reported style, and style exposure specifications in 
this table repeat the results of Tables 11A and 11B.  When the S&P 500 excess returns and S&P 
500 excess return consistency a re tested together, the 5-year excess return coefficient is no 
longer significant, nor are many of the consistency coefficients that were separately significant in  
Table 11B.  When style indicator excess returns and style indicator excess return consistency are 
tested together, the marginally significant 3 -year and 5 -year return coefficients become 
insignificant, but the Path 1 coefficient retains its positive sign and significance.  Taken together, 
these results begin to suggest that plan sponsor decisions about moving an entire account from 
one manager (product) to another take total and excess return under consideration, along with 
consistency relative to style benchmarks rather than the S&P 500. 
To further explore the relative importance of total return relative to excess return in the 
account allocation decision, Table 13 reports coefficient estimates for a full model that includes 
total and excess return, excess return consistency and product attribute variables.  The  
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importance of both total and excess returns is confirmed.  Robust to inclusion of the various 
excess return benchmarks, the 1-year total return < 0 interaction term is positive and significant, 
reflecting plan sponsors penalization of managers with 1-year total return losses by giving them 
fewer accounts or withdrawing more accounts relative to the average equity product.  Poor 1-
year performance relative to style benchmarks is also penalized, as the coefficients on the 1-year 
< 0 interaction term across all benchmarks are positive and significant (though only at the 10% 
level for two of the three).  This is less surprising than seeing a manager punished for poor 1-
year total return, as it reflects performance relative to average market or style performance.  
Positive 3-year total return is favored by plan sponsors in account allocation as it was 
with asset flow allocation; the coefficient remains positive and highly significant even after 
including excess return variables.  The highly significant negative 5-year total return coefficients 
and positive excess return coefficients present a less straightforward relationship between 
performance and account flows.  Since our fixed-effects regressions are estimating within-
product variation, the negative total return factor suggests that, holding excess return constant, 
products have poorer account flows (lose more or gain less than average) when product and 
benchmark returns are high than with lower product and benchmark returns.  The positive excess 
return factor suggests that products have better account flows when product excess returns are 
high; with total returns being held constant, this implies that benchmark returns are low.  In both 
cases, the results suggest that products  have better  (worse) account flows when  the average 
benchmark return  has been low  (high) over the preceding five years, highlighting a role  for 
benchmarks and not just total return (as with asset flows) over the 5-year horizon.  These results 
are consistent with certain re-allocation decisions that sponsors make.  Their institutional plans 
have target allocations among asset classes, investment styles, or even specific managers, and  
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when the current allocations exceed bands around these targets, sponsors reduce the allocations 
to bring them back closer to target levels.  If the allocations have grown because of strong 
performance in an asset class, style, or sector, all of which would be reflected in their respective 
benchmarks, and sponsors subsequently reduce their allocations, products having worse account 
flows when the average benchmark return has been high is what would be observed.  Our result 
coincides with this. 
Overall, the results of Table 13 suggest a slightly more complex decision process when 
plan sponsors allocate accounts, perhaps reflecting that they utilize a higher hurdle when making 
the decision to fire rather than simply reduce assets.  As with asset flows, the magnitude of total 
returns play a punitive role in the short term (1-year < 0 interaction term) as well as a 
contributory and punitive role in the longer term (3-year term).  But when allocating accounts, 
the magnitude of benchmark-based excess returns, including those relative to style benchmarks, 
are also considered.  They play a punitive role in the short-term (1-year < 0 interaction term for 
style specifications) as well as both a contributory and punitive role in the longer-term (positive 
5-year excess return coefficients), although this latter relationship is clouded somewhat by the 
negative total return coefficient.  In addition, the results of T able 13 reflect that plan sponsors 
also evaluate consistency when making account allocation decisions, looking for managers with 
consistent out-performance relative to style benchmarks (Path 1) based on products’ self-
reported styles or our style indicator. 
To examine whether different criteria are used by plan sponsors in the more specific case 
of replacing an equity manager with another equity manager, Tables 14, 15, and 16 report 
regression results for the within equity subsample.  While all adjusted-r
2 and within-r
2 are higher, 
likely due to more homogeneity in the subsample, account flows between equity products are  
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again largely driven by non-performance factors.  Overall, the results are similar to those for the 
broader equity sample.  The 3-year total return coefficients remain positive and significant, the 5-
year total return coefficients remain negative and significant, and the 5 -year excess return 
coefficients remain positive and significant.  Though the 1-year < 0 interaction term for style 
indicator excess returns is no longer significant,  the coefficients on these terms retain their 
marginal significance for self-reported and style exposure excess returns. 
  There are some noticeable differences.  The 1-year < 0 interaction term on total return is 
not significant for the within equity subsample, suggesting that plan sponsors are less likely to 
reallocate accounts between equity products for poor 1-year performance than they are to 
reallocate accounts in general.  The Path 1 coefficients for self-reported and style indicator 
excess returns are not significant in Table 16 as they were in Table 13.  This suggests that plan 
sponsors seek out equity managers who deliver consistent positive return relative to these 
benchmarks when they are allocating accounts in general – within equity or between equity and 
non-equity – but they do not do this when specifically looking to replace one equity manager 
with another.  Finally, the lagged account flows attribute coefficient was negative and significant 
in the larger sample, but generally is not in the “within equity” subsample.  This makes sense, 
since the larger sample maintains more of a time series while the subsample extracts transactions 
that represent specific conditions.  Practically, if the subsample truly does reflect specific cases 
of a sponsor firing one equity manager and replacing him/her with another, then the manager’s 
prior period account flows would not be expected to have any relationship to that decision. 
  Overall, while the factors that explain account flows between equity products are similar 
to those that explain account flows in general, there are systematic and interesting differences.  
One additional such difference is that within this subsample, the incremental explanatory power  
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of the performance variables over that provided by just the product attribute variables is 
proportionately less.  As seen in Table 16, the within-r
2 for the S&P 500 specification is 0.1318.  
Using only the product attributes, within-r
2 is 0.0948.  In comparison, the within-r
2‘s in the large 
sample are 0.0910 for the full model with performance variables (Table 13) and 0.0571 with only 
the product attributes.  This suggests that within the equity market when a sponsor looks to 
replace one manager with another equity manager, there is very little relationship between 




Overall, asset and account flows between products are only partially explained by the 
products’ performance and attributes.  This suggests that plan sponsors largely use qualitative 
considerations, such as subjective measures of manager skill,  the level of customer services 
provided, and the relationship with the manager, in the asset allocation, account allocation, and 
hiring and firing decisions. 
While products gained assets and accounts on average over the period studied, products 
that consistently produce positive (negative) excess returns, regardless of the amount of that 
excess, attract  significantly more (fewer) assets.  Products with lower tracking error attract 
accounts.  This suggests that, at some point in the evaluation/selection process, plan sponsors 
screen products on active return.  The S&P 500 appears to play a larger role in these screens for 
decisions to move assets than do style benchmarks, while style benchmarks are important when a 
sponsor contemplates moving an entire account.  Plan sponsors do not appear to consider the 
level of style exposure when doing consistency screens.   
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Beyond performance consistency, plan sponsors are sensitive to the managers’ total 
return when allocating assets and accounts.  Products capture (lose) greater than average assets 
and accounts for positive (negative) 3 and 5-year total returns.  Products with poor 1-year total 
return lose assets and experience sub-par account flows, but this factor does not appear to be 
relevant to specific cases of hiring and firing among equity products.  There is evidence that plan 
sponsors are sensitive to the spread of excess return when allocating whole accounts.  Products 
with positive (negative) 5-year excess return relative to the S&P 500 and style benchmarks do 
better (worse) than the average product in terms of account flows. 
Plan sponsors exhibit a tendency to favor products with smaller asset bases and longer 
track records.  Asset flows exhibit positive serial correlation, products that gain assets continue 
to gain assets, while account flows exhibit negative serial correlation, products with below-
average a ccount flows relative to the average product later have above average flows. The 
consistency of results between asset and account flow measures offers assurance that a few large 
plan sponsors do not drive the behavior observed.  While performance relationships are similar 
between asset and account flows, the account flow relationships show more relevant factors, 
suggesting that the decision-making process behind allocating assets versus placing accounts is 
slightly different and reflects that plan sponsors more easily move assets than they do their entire 
accounts. 
These results are consistent with an agency theory interpretation.  Plan sponsors seek to 
minimize job risk by hiring and firing managers based largely on qualitative factors and 
consistent excess returns while responding to potential investor pressure by allocating assets 
based on total returns.  
  31 
In this study, we have explored the factors determining institutional plan sponsors 
decisions to hire and fire professional managers.  What has not been explored is whether these 
decisions add or subtract value for investors.  This is the topic of current research.  Preliminary 
results suggest that plan sponsors are unsuccessful in creating value; however, additional 
research is required to fully study this question and is reserved for a follow-up study. 
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Table 1.  Distribution of Style Indicator 
This table reports the distribution of style indicators over the sample period. Product i is designated as growth 
(value), and assigned an indicator of 0 (1), if its estimated sensitivity to the Russell 1000 Growth (Value) index, bG,i,t 
(bV,i,t), using bivariate regressions for the 6 -year period t is significant.  Products where both coefficients are 
significant are assigned a style indicator calculated as: 
Style Indicatori,t = 
t i, G, t i, V,
, ,





t i V  
Products with less than 20 quarterly return observations or an adjusted-r




Period  Obs  Style Indicator 
    0  0 < x £ 0.2  0.2 < x £ 0.4  0.4 < x £ 0.6  0.6 < x £ 0.8  0.8 < x < 1  1 
1979-1984  316  34.8%  0.3%  4.4%  13.3% 11.4%  1.6%  34.2% 
1980-1985  366  36.9%  0.0%  3.0%  15.0% 10.4%  1.9%  32.8% 
1981-1986  424  35.8%  0.0%  5.9%  19.1% 9.7%  0.5%  29.0% 
1982-1987  537  37.6%  0.2%  8.4%  19.6% 10.6%  1.1%  22.5% 
1983-1988  606  33.3%  0.5%  9.1%  18.6% 11.6%  0.7%  26.2% 
1984-1989  709  31.7%  0.3%  9.4%  19.9% 9.4%  1.1%  28.1% 
1985-1990  865  29.4%  0.5%  8.9%  16.4% 10.4%  1.4%  33.1% 
1986-1991  1062  28.4%  0.9%  7.3%  15.6% 12.6%  1.2%  33.8% 
1987-1992  1198  32.4%  1.1%  6.5%  15.5% 8.0%  1.0%  35.5% 
1988-1993  1296  25.5%  1.2%  10.6%  22.7% 15.4%  1.0%  23.6% 
1989-1994  1473  27.7%  1.2%  9.8%  24.0% 15.5%  1.6%  20.2% 
1990-1995  1606  33.0%  0.9%  9.4%  24.8% 14.4%  0.9%  16.6% 
1991-1996  1438  33.4%  0.5%  10.6%  27.5% 15.0%  0.7%  12.4% 
1992-1997  1365  25.8%  0.4%  11.9%  30.8% 15.5%  1.2%  14.5% 
1993-1998  1976  24.1%  0.4%  7.7%  22.8% 12.7%  1.1%  31.3% 
1994-1999  2260  37.7%  0.9%  8.1%  15.5% 10.5%  3.7%  23.6% 
1995-2000  2248  34.3%  0.4%  6.9%  17.3% 13.5%  7.8%  19.7% 
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Table 2. Distribution of Style Indicator Categorized by Self-reported Style 
This table reports the distribution of style indicators over the sample period categorized by the product’s 2000 self-
reported style.  Product i is designated as growth (value), and assigned an indicator of 0 (1), if its estimated 
sensitivity to the Russell 1000 Growth (Value) index, bG,i,t (bV,i,t), using bivariate regressions for the 6-year period t 
is significant.  Products where both coefficients are significant are assigned a style indicator calculated as: 
 
Style Indicatori,t = 
t i, G, t i, V,
, ,





t i V  
 
Products with less than 20 quarterly return observations or an adjusted-r
2 £ 0.50 are excluded. 
 
A. Self-reported Growth 
Year  Style Indicator 
  0  0 < x £ 0.4  0.4 < x £ 0.6  0.6 < x < 1  1 
1989  68.1%  14.9%  11.7%  2.1%  3.2% 
1990  61.5%  17.2%  9.8%  6.6%  4.9% 
1991  63.2%  13.8%  9.9%  8.6%  4.6% 
1992  58.9%  15.0%  11.7%  5.6%  8.9% 
1993  70.6%  9.8%  10.3%  3.7%  5.6% 
1994  53.3%  18.8%  17.6%  5.9%  4.4% 
1995  56.8%  17.5%  18.8%  3.6%  3.3% 
1996  64.9%  15.4%  16.0%  2.5%  1.3% 
1997  62.2%  18.0%  16.3%  3.2%  0.4% 
1998  53.3%  15.0%  16.2%  11.8%  3.7% 
1999  49.8%  12.0%  16.7%  13.5%  8.0% 
2000  60.1%  23.4%  9.5%  4.5%  2.4% 
Overall  58.5%  16.2%  14.5%  6.7%  4.2% 
Cum.  58.5%  74.7%  89.2%  95.9%  100.1% 
 
 
B. Self-reported Value 
Year  Style Indicator 
  0  0 < x £ 0.4  0.4 < x £ 0.6  0.6 < x < 1  1 
1989  18.0%  2.0%  16.0%  21.0%  43.0% 
1990  9.4%  3.6%  17.3%  24.5%  45.3% 
1991  8.3%  2.2%  14.9%  22.7%  51.9% 
1992  5.1%  4.0%  13.1%  25.3%  52.5% 
1993  8.5%  5.4%  14.3%  16.1%  55.6% 
1994  5.7%  6.4%  18.5%  29.9%  39.5% 
1995  4.6%  5.2%  19.3%  40.7%  30.2% 
1996  6.8%  6.4%  22.3%  42.9%  21.6% 
1997  7.8%  5.7%  20.9%  39.5%  26.0% 
1998  5.0%  3.6%  21.1%  35.4%  34.9% 
1999  4.8%  2.7%  10.7%  30.9%  50.8% 
2000  13.5%  1.7%  9.8%  29.3%  45.7% 
Overall  7.3%  4.1%  16.5%  31.6%  40.4% 
Cum.  99.9%  92.6%  88.5%  72.0%  40.4% 
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Table 3. Distribution of Style Exposure Categorized by Self-reported Style 
This table reports the distribution of style exposures over the sample period categorized by the product’s 2000 self-
reported style.  A product’s style exposure is its estimated sensitivity to the Russell 1000 Value or Growth 1000 
Growth indices using bivariate regressions for the 6-year period t, bV,i,t and bG,i,t respectively, if the coefficient is 
significant.  Products where both coefficients are significant are assigned a style exposure calculated as: 
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￿ ￿  
 
Products with less than 20 quarterly return observations or an adjusted-r
2 £ 0.50 are excluded. 
 
A. Self-reported Growth 
Year  Style Exposure 
  0 < bi,t,G £ 0.5  0.5 < bi,t,G £ 1.0  1.0 < bi,t,G £ 1.5  1.5 < bi,t,G £ 2.0  2.0 < bi,t,G 
1989  7.7%  67.0%  23.1%  2.2%  0.0% 
1990  8.6%  71.6%  16.4%  1.7%  1.7% 
1991  10.3%  68.3%  15.2%  1.4%  4.8% 
1992  11.6%  58.5%  25.6%  1.2%  3.0% 
1993  9.4%  53.5%  29.2%  5.4%  2.5% 
1994  11.5%  58.8%  25.8%  2.3%  1.5% 
1995  9.6%  61.4%  27.0%  1.7%  0.3% 
1996  9.8%  58.1%  28.9%  2.5%  0.6% 
1997  11.7%  60.3%  24.1%  2.8%  1.1% 
1998  11.0%  53.1%  22.4%  3.8%  9.7% 
1999  10.3%  57.9%  17.9%  2.0%  12.0% 
2000  5.4%  42.8%  24.9%  17.8%  9.0% 
Overall  9.7%  57.0%  23.7%  4.6%  5.1% 
Cum.  9.7%  66.7%  90.4%  95.0%  100.1% 
 
B. Self-reported Value 
Year  Style Exposure 
  0 < bi,t,V £ 0.5  0.5 < bi,t,V £ 1.0  1.0 < bi,t,V £ 1.5  1.5 < bi,t,V £ 2.0  2.0 < bi,t,V 
1989  18.3%  65.9%  15.9%  0.0%  0.0% 
1990  19.8%  59.5%  14.3%  0.0%  6.3% 
1991  14.5%  62.0%  19.9%  0.0%  3.6% 
1992  14.4%  58.0%  25.0%  1.1%  1.6% 
1993  17.2%  58.8%  18.1%  2.9%  2.5% 
1994  20.0%  64.5%  15.1%  0.4%  0.0% 
1995  20.6%  69.4%  8.6%  0.7%  0.3% 
1996  25.7%  70.3%  3.6%  0.0%  0.4% 
1997  22.3%  72.9%  3.3%  0.0%  1.5% 
1998  17.5%  67.8%  5.3%  0.5%  9.0% 
1999  9.7%  66.2%  13.9%  0.4%  9.7% 
2000  8.6%  50.5%  37.2%  1.7%  1.3% 
Overall  16.9%  64.5%  14.1%  0.7%  3.7% 
Cum.  16.9%  81.4%  95.5%  96.2%  99.9% 
  
  35 
Table 3. Distribution of Style Exposure Categorized by Self-reported style (cont.) 
 
 
C. Self-reported as Neither Growth nor Value 
Year  Style Exposure 
  0  0 < bi,t,G £ 0.5  0.5 < bi,t,G £ 1.0 1.0 < bi,t,G £ 1.5 1.5 < bi,t,G £ 2.0  2.0 < bi,t,G 
1989  29.6%  31.5%  37.0%  1.9%  0.0%  0.0% 
1990  28.2%  24.4%  39.7%  3.8%  0.0%  3.8% 
1991  29.9%  29.9%  34.0%  1.0%  0.0%  5.2% 
1992  29.1%  32.5%  35.0%  1.7%  0.0%  0.9% 
1993  25.6%  34.4%  34.4%  4.8%  0.0%  0.8% 
1994  16.0%  39.5%  42.0%  1.9%  0.0%  0.6% 
1995  15.4%  42.6%  39.4%  1.6%  0.0%  1.1% 
1996  8.6%  46.2%  42.5%  2.2%  0.0%  0.5% 
1997  8.6%  52.0%  35.4%  3.0%  0.0%  1.0% 
1998  14.5%  40.1%  35.3%  4.1%  0.0%  5.9% 
1999  18.6%  36.4%  34.7%  2.4%  0.0%  7.2% 
2000  13.0%  33.6%  43.0%  6.7%  1.3%  0.0% 
Overall  17.3%  38.6%  37.8%  3.1%  0.2%  2.7% 
Cum.  17.3%  55.9%  93.7%  96.8%  97.0%  99.7% 
 
D. Self-reported as Neither Growth nor Value 
Year  Style Exposure 
  0  0 < bi,t,V £ 0.5  0.5 < bi,t,V £ 1.0 1.0 < bi,t,V £ 1.5 1.5 < bi,t,V £ 2.0  2.0 < bi,t,V 
1989  25.9%  24.1%  44.4%  3.7%  0.0%  0.0% 
1990  29.5%  24.4%  35.9%  3.8%  1.3%  3.8% 
1991  22.7%  23.7%  39.2%  7.2%  1.0%  5.2% 
1992  18.8%  26.5%  41.0%  8.5%  2.6%  1.7% 
1993  22.4%  28.8%  40.0%  6.4%  0.8%  0.8% 
1994  10.5%  41.4%  38.9%  7.4%  0.0%  0.6% 
1995  13.3%  36.7%  44.1%  3.7%  0.0%  1.1% 
1996  11.8%  44.1%  41.4%  1.1%  0.0%  0.5% 
1997  8.1%  39.4%  49.0%  1.0%  0.0%  1.0% 
1998  13.0%  35.7%  41.6%  3.0%  0.0%  5.9% 
1999  12.0%  26.1%  49.8%  4.5%  0.0%  7.2% 
2000  23.3%  27.4%  43.9%  5.4%  0.0%  0.0% 
Overall  15.6%  32.7%  43.4%  4.3%  0.3%  2.7% 






Table 4. Number of Products, Aggregate Assets and Flows 
This table reports annual summary statistics for all equity products in the Effron PSN database and the test sample.  Part B reports the percentage of the PSN 
database included in the test sample. 
 
A. Levels 
  PSN Database  Sample 
Year  Products  Assets  Flows  Products  Assets  Flows 
      Inflows  Outflows  Net      Inflows  Outflows  Net 
1989  987  592,185.8 43,130.5  -50,789.8  -7,659.3  267 289,788.1  16,923.4  -24,304.6 -7,381.2 
1990  1147  570,177.8 57,695.0  -54,903.9  2,791.1  380 320,840.1  26,240.3  -32,619.3 -6,379.0 
1991  1332  851,605.2 92,112.7  -65,089.7  27,023.0  493 517,436.8  49,068.1  -50,772.8 -1,704.8 
1992  1721  1,047,710.0 127,655.5  -131,493.9  -3,838.4  568 604,850.8  66,489.3  -57,329.3 9,160.0 
1993  2029  1,460,082.0 197,204.3  -105,290.6  91,913.7  652 762,046.1  83,629.1  -66,294.0 17,335.1 
1994  2292  1,668,090.0 211,503.8  -105,574.3  105,929.5  837 983,717.6  106,832.7  -71,303.3 35,529.4 
1995  2584  2,445,747.0 280,982.9  -176,362.3  104,620.6  933 1,349,313.0  116,357.2  -114,851.2 1,506.1 
1996  2796  3,174,311.0 396,617.3  -227,612.4  169,004.9  898 1,663,956.0  158,480.3  -126,072.9 32,407.4 
1997  2942  3,928,199.0 526,976.9  -387,439.4  139,537.5  852 2,091,629.0  175,827.8  -225,697.0 -49,869.3 
1998  2897  4,478,738.0 497,049.4  -464,425.9  32,623.5  1285 3,106,344.0  310,500.6  -318,936.1 -8,435.6 
1999  2976  5,566,321.0 625,025.9  -737,052.0  -112,026.1  1504 4,004,781.0  406,496.3  -554,201.8 -147,705.4 
2000  2193  4,433,897.0 667,519.5  -511,941.4  155,578.1  1200 3,257,119.0  428,502.6  -371,520.6 56,982.1 
 
B. Percentage 
Year  Products  Assets  Flows 
    Aggregate  Inflows  Outflows 
1989  27.1%  48.9% 39.2%  47.9% 
1990  33.1%  56.3% 45.5%  59.4% 
1991  37.0%  60.8% 53.3%  78.0% 
1992  33.0%  57.7% 52.1%  43.6% 
1993  32.1%  52.2% 42.4%  63.0% 
1994  36.5%  59.0% 50.5%  67.5% 
1995  36.1%  55.2% 41.4%  65.1% 
1996  32.1%  52.4% 40.0%  55.4% 
1997  29.0%  53.2% 33.4%  58.3% 
1998  44.4%  69.4% 62.5%  68.7% 
1999  50.5%  71.9% 65.0%  75.2% 
2000  54.7%  73.5% 64.2%  72.6% 
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Table 5. Net Flows v. Excess Return 
This table reports annual mean and standard deviations of net flows and excess return per product in the test sample.  Excess returns are calculated relative to the 
S&P 500 and the product’s self-reported style index using the Russell 1000 Value or Russell 1000 Growth indexes.  Flows are reported in millions of dollars. 
 
Year  Products  Net Flows  SP500  Self-reported Style 
        1-year  3-year  5-year  1-year  3-year  5-year 
    /Product  s  /Product  s  /Product  s  /Product  s  /Product  s  /Product  s  /Product  s 
1989  267  -27.6  335.9  0.43% 6.63%  -0.74% 3.89%  -0.77%  3.72% -0.31%  6.22%  0.19% 3.84%  0.05%  3.60%
1990  380  -16.8  376.7  -3.47% 7.85%  -1.26% 3.83%  -0.79%  3.89% -2.20%  7.05%  -0.22% 3.84%  -0.06%  3.89%
1991  493  -3.5  513.5  -1.12% 7.72%  -1.11% 3.97%  -0.66%  4.11% 0.15%  7.43%  -0.46% 3.94%  0.41%  4.12%
1992  568  16.1  533.6  6.42% 15.20%  0.22% 7.13%  0.24%  4.19% 4.21%  13.59%  0.43% 6.11%  0.78%  3.89%
1993  652  26.6  630.4  2.41% 6.99%  2.80% 5.81%  1.43%  4.21% 0.70%  6.93%  2.01% 5.38%  1.03%  4.01%
1994  837  42.4  515.1  5.08% 8.41%  5.17% 6.59%  2.24%  4.39% 4.68%  9.93%  3.83% 6.99%  1.94%  4.20%
1995  933  1.6  615.4  -1.11% 4.52%  2.12% 4.16%  2.52%  3.76% -0.14%  5.21%  1.87% 4.19%  2.25%  3.70%
1996  898  36.1  881.6  -3.07% 6.90%  -0.32% 3.50%  1.72%  3.67% -3.24%  6.98%  0.01% 3.67%  1.15%  3.76%
1997  852  -58.5  1669.7  -0.13% 5.04%  -1.45% 3.55%  0.15%  2.84% 0.44%  5.07%  -0.92% 3.65%  0.02%  2.77%
1998  1285  -6.6  1530.2  -5.17% 8.72%  -3.47% 5.35%  -0.96%  3.10% -4.69%  8.59%  -3.16% 5.35%  -0.62%  3.08%
1999  1504  -98.2  1881.6  -10.51% 14.27%  -6.70% 7.16%  -5.24%  5.32% -9.20%  13.92%  -5.79% 7.31%  -4.50%  5.44%




Table 6. Captured Flow Decile v. S&P500 Excess Return Decile 
This table reports the mean captured flow by decile categorized by return decile. 
 
A. 1-year S&P 500 Excess Return 
  Return Decile  1 (low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 (high) 
1 (low)  -0.002772  -0.003037  -0.002944  -0.003140  -0.003632  -0.003976  -0.002471  -0.001685  -0.001837  -0.001303 
2  -0.000548  -0.000508  -0.000583  -0.000479  -0.000662  -0.000551  -0.000325  -0.000198  -0.000197  -0.000123 
3  -0.000251  -0.000168  -0.000248  -0.000180  -0.000248  -0.000189  -0.000075  -0.000047  -0.000039  -0.000016 
4  -0.000123  -0.000068  -0.000104  -0.000065  -0.000087  -0.000050  -0.000014  -0.000005  -0.000002  0.000005 
5  -0.000063  -0.000025  -0.000037  -0.000015  -0.000024  -0.000007  0.000004  0.000010  0.000017  0.000030 
6  -0.000024  -0.000004  -0.000008  0.000000  -0.000001  0.000014  0.000029  0.000050  0.000052  0.000077 
7  -0.000005  0.000011  0.000005  0.000017  0.000023  0.000074  0.000088  0.000129  0.000130  0.000179 
8  0.000007  0.000070  0.000039  0.000070  0.000092  0.000221  0.000255  0.000295  0.000327  0.000392 
9  0.000075  0.000266  0.000189  0.000242  0.000300  0.000619  0.000648  0.000732  0.000806  0.000864 
Flow 
Decile 
10 (high)  0.000983  0.001519  0.001505  0.001388  0.002460  0.004909  0.002996  0.003500  0.003423  0.003172 
 
B. 3-year S&P 500 Excess Return 
  Return Decile  1 (low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 (high) 
1 (low)  -0.002451  -0.002007  -0.003354  -0.003303  -0.003188  -0.004399  -0.002787  -0.002239  -0.001882  -0.001202 
2  -0.000494  -0.000404  -0.000586  -0.000559  -0.000596  -0.000552  -0.000395  -0.000335  -0.000176  -0.000085 
3  -0.000245  -0.000152  -0.000213  -0.000203  -0.000224  -0.000166  -0.000111  -0.000078  -0.000034  -0.000007 
4  -0.000120  -0.000059  -0.000082  -0.000081  -0.000080  -0.000051  -0.000021  -0.000011  -0.000001  0.000014 
5  -0.000064  -0.000020  -0.000024  -0.000028  -0.000022  -0.000007  0.000001  0.000010  0.000020  0.000051 
6  -0.000025  -0.000005  -0.000003  -0.000003  -0.000001  0.000012  0.000020  0.000048  0.000065  0.000116 
7  -0.000004  0.000004  0.000007  0.000015  0.000021  0.000061  0.000080  0.000149  0.000184  0.000233 
8  0.000013  0.000039  0.000043  0.000062  0.000078  0.000189  0.000209  0.000386  0.000381  0.000434 
9  0.000091  0.000163  0.000164  0.000200  0.000261  0.000573  0.000614  0.000909  0.000885  0.000944 
Flow 
Decile 
10 (high)  0.001072  0.001334  0.001332  0.001317  0.001476  0.004665  0.002972  0.003935  0.004198  0.003271 
 
C. 5-year S&P 500 Excess Return 
  Return Decile  1 (low)  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 (high) 
1 (low)  -0.002172  -0.002428  -0.003031  -0.003815  -0.003282  -0.004140  -0.002533  -0.002355  -0.001788  -0.001320 
2  -0.000454  -0.000455  -0.000531  -0.000622  -0.000506  -0.000614  -0.000365  -0.000350  -0.000208  -0.000090 
3  -0.000222  -0.000155  -0.000203  -0.000206  -0.000177  -0.000210  -0.000115  -0.000093  -0.000041  -0.000006 
4  -0.000106  -0.000070  -0.000080  -0.000067  -0.000064  -0.000062  -0.000026  -0.000015  -0.000002  0.000017 
5  -0.000053  -0.000026  -0.000028  -0.000017  -0.000016  -0.000010  0.000001  0.000003  0.000021  0.000054 
6  -0.000017  -0.000005  -0.000005  0.000000  0.000001  0.000010  0.000024  0.000031  0.000072  0.000126 
7  -0.000002  0.000006  0.000005  0.000017  0.000025  0.000060  0.000085  0.000108  0.000182  0.000259 
8  0.000013  0.000045  0.000036  0.000068  0.000089  0.000159  0.000245  0.000270  0.000374  0.000486 
9  0.000084  0.000202  0.000134  0.000229  0.000308  0.000514  0.000636  0.000685  0.000860  0.000969 
Flow 
Decile 
10 (high)  0.000933  0.001694  0.001044  0.001757  0.001959  0.004794  0.002794  0.003696  0.003917  0.003217 
  
41 
Table 7. Asset Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of captured flows, the percentage 
of year t’s industry-aggregate equity flows captured by product i, on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Asset Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Returni,t-t, Return Consistencyi,t -t, Product Attributesi,t-1) 
 
A. Total and Excess Return Variables 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 




    adjusted-r
2  0.0440  0.0462  0.0454  0.0445  0.0401 
    within-r
2  0.0480  0.0469  0.0440  0.0438  0.0409 
    Constant  0.00215  0.00241  0.00233  0.00238  0.00229 
      (11.69)  (13.31)  (12.73)  (12.67)  (12.19) 
Return  1-year  Return  0.00006  0.00047  0.00047  0.00043  0.00090 
      (0.37)  (1.67)  (1.55)  (1.32)  (2.65) 
    < 0 interaction  0.00337  0.00084  0.00077  0.00098  0.00013 
      (2.96)  (1.47)  (1.27)  (1.44)  (0.17) 
  3-year  Return  0.00134  0.00246  0.00274  0.00236  0.00219 
      (3.02)  (2.38)  (2.40)  (1.83)  (2.28) 
    < 0 interaction  -0.01916  -0.00165  -0.00213  -0.00083  -0.00199 
      (-0.71)  (-1.04)  (-1.23)  (-0.42)  (-1.02) 
  5-year  Return  0.00280  0.00237  0.00361  0.00392  0.00139 
      (4.31)  (1.64)  (2.31)  (2.23)  (1.15) 
    < 0 interaction    -0.00089  -0.00327  -0.00419  -0.00309 
        (-0.41)  (-1.42)  (-1.62)  (-1.39) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.00015  -0.00031  -0.00030  -0.00032  -0.00024 
      (-2.29)  (-4.85)  (-4.66)  (-4.82)  (-3.65) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.00048  -0.00039  -0.00038  -0.00039  -0.00042 
      (-16.33)  (-13.49)  (-13.35)  (-13.21)  (-14.26) 
    Lagged Captured flows  0.03087  0.02158  0.02409  0.02376  0.02963 
      (2.83)  (1.96)  (2.19)  (2.12)  (2.65) 
 
B. Return Consistency Variables 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 
      Return  S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style 
Indicator 
Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0384  0.0576  0.0553  0.0552  0.0415 
    within-r
2  0.0355  0.0575  0.0526  0.0517  0.0406 
Consistency     Path-1 (+++)  0.00062  0.00052  0.00055  0.00060  0.00032 
      (1.07)  (4.56)  (5.36)  (5.12)  (1.66) 
    Path-2 (++-)  0.00020  -0.00003  -0.00001  0.00006  -0.00007 
      (0.34)  (-0.28)  (-0.09)  (0.64)  (-0.37) 
    Path-3 (-++)  0.00072  0.00010  0.00021  0.00019  0.00006 
      (0.37)  (0.74)  (1.60)  (1.27)  (0.22) 
    Constant  0.00255  0.00245  0.00234  0.00239  0.00314 
      (3.90)  (7.27)  (6.98)  (6.84)  (8.15) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.00014  -0.00002  0.00010  0.00008 
        (-0.82)  (-0.11)  (0.59)  (0.27) 
    Path-6 (+--)  0.00047  -0.00010  0.00003  0.00001  -0.00026 
      (0.62)  (-0.82)  (0.26)  (0.11)  (-1.17) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.00020  -0.00000  0.00002  0.00008 
        (-1.53)  (-0.04)  (0.18)  (0.37) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.00033  -0.00022  -0.00016  -0.00021 
        (-2.88)  (-2.10)  (-1.35)  (-1.02) 
    Volatility  0.00023  0.00007  0.00005  0.00008  0.00031 
      (2.36)  (0.70)  (0.56)  (0.83)  (2.96) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.00022  -0.00031  -0.00030  -0.00031  -0.00026 
      (-3.43)  (-4.87)  (-4.79)  (-4.84)  (-3.95) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.00041  -0.00036  -0.00037  -0.00037  -0.00040 
      (-14.28)  (-12.80)  (-12.90)  (-12.64)  (-13.62) 
    Lagged Captured flows  0.03538  0.01617  0.02273  0.02030  0.03084 
      (3.22)  (1.47)  (2.07)  (1.82)  (2.76)  
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Table 7. Asset Flows Model (continued) 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of captured flows, the percentage 
of year t’s industry-aggregate  equity flows captured by product i, on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Asset Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Returni,t-t, Return Consistencyi,t -t, Product Attributesi,t-1) 
 
C. Combined Consistency Path Variables 
Category  Variable    Style Excess Return Benchmark 
        Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0590  0.0619  0.0614  0.0598 
    within-r
2  0.0597  0.0640  0.0622  0.0611 
    Constant  0.00239  0.00231  0.00235  0.00253 
      (3.69)  (3.56)  (3.56)  (3.67) 
Total    Path-1 (+++)  0.00030  0.00020  0.00022  0.00030 
Return      (0.52)  (0.35)  (0.38)  (0.51) 
Consistency    Path-2 (++-)  0.00003  -0.00005  -0.00004  0.00008 
      (0.06)  (-0.08)  (-0.07)  (0.14) 
    Path-3 (-++)  0.00058  0.00038  0.00045  0.00057 
      (0.30)  (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.30) 
    Path-5 (-+-)         
             
    Path-6 (+--)  0.00032  0.00026  0.00021  0.00030 
      (0.43)  (0.35)  (0.27)  (0.39) 
    Path-7 (--+)         
             
    Path-8 (---)         
             
S&P 500     Path-1 (+++)  0.00050  0.00037  0.00036  0.00049 
Excess      (4.37)  (3.04)  (2.85)  (4.18) 
Return    Path-2 (++-)  0.00002  0.00006  -0.00001  0.00003 
Consistency      (0.15)  (0.43)  (-0.04)  (0.24) 
    Path-3 (-++)  0.00009  0.00005  0.00005  0.00009 
      (0.62)  (0.36)  (0.30)  (0.64) 
    Path-5 (-+-)  -0.00010  -0.00007  -0.00012  -0.00009 
      (-0.56)  (-0.40)  (-0.68)  (-0.50) 
    Path-6 (+--)  -0.00007  -0.00003  -0.00004  -0.00005 
      (-0.58)  (-0.24)  (-0.31)  (-0.37) 
    Path-7 (--+)  -0.00021  -0.00020  -0.00020  -0.00020 
      (-1.60)  (-1.46)  (-1.40)  (-1.55) 
    Path-8 (---)  -0.00031  -0.00022  -0.00026  -0.00028 
      (-2.69)  (-1.80)  (-1.97)  (-2.38) 
    Volatility  0.00013  0.00010  0.00012  0.00017 
      (1.30)  (1.04)  (1.21)  (1.60) 
Style     Path-1 (+++)    0.00031  0.00032  0.00004 
Excess        (2.82)  (2.48)  (0.21) 
Return    Path-2 (++-)    -0.00005  0.00009  -0.00009 
Consistency        (-0.39)  (0.65)  (-0.45) 
    Path-3 (-++)    0.00013  0.00012  -0.00013 
        (0.93)  (0.77)  (-0.49) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    0.00004  0.00017  0.00001 
        (0.25)  (0.99)  (0.04) 
    Path-6 (+--)    0.00008  0.00009  -0.00020 
        (0.63)  (0.61)  (-0.92) 
    Path-7 (--+)    0.00007  0.00011  -0.00002 
        (0.59)  (0.81)  (-0.11) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.00006  0.00004  -0.00007 
        (-0.55)  (0.29)  (-0.34) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.00030  -0.00031  -0.00032  -0.00031 
      (-4.72)  (-4.92)  (-4.87)  (-4.77) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.00037  -0.00037  -0.00037  -0.00038 
      (-13.09)  (-12.92)  (-12.79)  (-12.92) 
    Lagged Captured flows  0.01748  0.01742  0.01688  0.01755 
      (1.59)  (1.58)  (1.51)  (1.57)  
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Table 8. Asset Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of captured flows, the percentage 
of year t’s industry-aggregate equity flows captured by product i, on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Asset Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Returni,t-t, Return Consistencyi,t -t, Product Attributesi,t-1) 
 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 
      Return  S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0436  0.0582  0.0560  0.0560  0.0426 
    within-r
2  0.0483  0.0583  0.0534  0.0529  0.0439 
Return  1-year  Return  0.00007  0.00019  0.00003  0.00023  0.00051 
      (0.40)  (0.62)  (0.08)  (0.67)  (1.42) 
    < 0 interaction  0.00372  0.00040  0.00027  0.00026  -0.00033 
      (2.48)  (0.65)  (0.41)  (0.35)  (-0.40) 
  3-year  Return  0.00144  -0.00034  0.00048  -0.00086  0.00191 
      (3.14)  (-0.30)  (0.38)  (-0.61)  (1.91) 
    < 0 interaction  0.00112  0.00048  -0.00033  0.00149  -0.00165 
      (0.02)  (0.29)  (-0.18)  (0.73)  (-0.81) 
  5-year  Return  0.00262  0.00085  0.00255  0.00337  0.00118 
      (3.77)  (0.54)  (1.50)  (1.79)  (0.92) 
    < 0 interaction    0.00020  -0.00257  -0.00361  -0.00237 
        (0.09)  (-1.11)  (-1.38)  (-1.03) 
Consistency    Path-1 (+++)  -0.00009  0.00050  0.00049  0.00056  0.00012 
      (-0.11)  (4.04)  (4.27)  (4.40)  (0.61) 
    Path-2 (++-)  -0.00008  -0.00001  -0.00004  0.00008  -0.00012 
      (-0.09)  (-0.10)  (-0.30)  (0.57)  (-0.59) 
    Path-3 (-++)  0.00069  0.00012  0.00024  0.00023  0.00002 
      (0.34)  (0.84)  (1.64)  (1.43)  (0.06) 
    Constant  0.00249  0.00251  0.00222  0.00228  0.00316 
      (2.82)  (6.88)  (6.23)  (6.20)  (8.03) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.00008  0.00002  0.00016  0.00007 
        (-0.44)  (0.14)  (0.91)  (0.22) 
    Path-6 (+--)  0.00042  -0.00007  0.00005  0.00005  -0.00021 
      (0.56)  (-0.54)  (0.45)  (0.37)  (-0.95) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.00016  0.00004  0.00006  0.00002 
        (-1.19)  (0.30)  (0.47)  (0.06) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.00020  -0.000142  -0.00006  -0.00017 
        (-1.62)  (-1.23)  (-0.43)  (-0.77) 
    Volatility  0.00008  0.00009  0.00002  0.00006  0.00032 
      (0.81)  (0.81)  (0.23)  (0.53)  (2.99) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.00015  -0.00032  -0.00031  -0.00033  -0.00025 
      (-2.31)  (-5.01)  (-4.86)  (-4.95)  (-3.75) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.00048  -0.00036  -0.00037  -0.00037  -0.00041 
      (-16.25)  (-12.72)  (-12.80)  (-12.61)  (-14.01) 
    Lagged Captured flows  0.03079  0.01622  0.02199  0.01989  0.02855 
      (2.81)  (1.47)  (1.99)  (1.78)  (2.56) 
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Table 9. Asset Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of captured flows, the percentage 
of year t’s industry-aggregate equity flows captured by product i, on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  In the “Total” column, excess return consistency calculated using total return and excess returns 
calculated using the S&P500.  Otherwise excess returns and excess return consistency are calculated relative to the 
indicated benchmark; the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, and style exposure.  The 
sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 excluding “Index -Passive”, 
“Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold and t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. 
 
Asset Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Returni,t-t, Return Consistencyi,t -t, Product Attributesi,t-1) 
 
Category  Variable  Total 
Return 
Consistency, 
Excess Return Benchmark 
      S&P 500 
Excess 
S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0487  0.0609  0.0597  0.0606  0.0462 
    within-r
2  0.0546  0.0659  0.0632  0.0517  0.0514 
Return  1-year  Total Return  -0.00026  -0.00012  0.00014  0.00007  -0.00009 
      (-1.07)  (-0.52)  (0.68)  (0.32)  (-0.33) 
    < 0 interaction  0.00256  0.00254  0.00273  0.00265  0.00324 
      (1.67)  (2.07)  (1.98)  (2.11)  (2.47) 
    Excess Return  0.00016  -0.00017  -0.00079  -0.00050  0.00013 
      (0.40)  (-0.44)  (-1.98)  (-1.17)  (0.26) 
    < 0 interaction  0.00106  0.00073  0.00080  0.00078  -0.00043 
      (1.68)  (1.13)  (1.20)  (1.02)  (-0.50) 
  3-year  Total Return  0.00123  0.00131  0.00100  0.00127  0.00121 
      (2.21)  (2.37)  (1.98)  (2.44)  (1.79) 
    < 0 interaction  -0.00210  -0.01875  -0.02284  -0.02403  -0.01550 
      (-0.04)  (-0.70)  (-0.85)  (-0.88)  (-0.56) 
    Excess Return  0.00066  -0.00210  -0.00064  -0.00300  0.00001 
      (0.54)  (-1.59)  (-0.47)  (-1.92)  (0.01) 
    < 0 interaction  0.00010  0.00171  0.00056  0.00340  -0.00041 
      (0.06)  (1.00)  (0.31)  (1.62)  (-0.19) 
  5-year  Total Return  0.00209  0.00211  0.00243  0.00235  0.00238 
      (2.63)  (2.69)  (3.21)  (3.04)  (2.67) 
    Excess Return  0.00207  0.00029  0.00141  0.00298  0.00076 
      (1.24)  (0.17)  (0.77)  (1.47)  (0.46) 
    < 0 interaction  -0.00076  0.00038  -0.00165  -0.00330  -0.00090 
      (-0.34)  (0.17)  (-0.69)  (-1.23)  (-0.37) 
Consistency    Path-1 (+++)  0.00002  0.00049  0.00042  0.00056  0.00012 
      (0.02)  (3.98)  (3.66)  (4.46)  (0.60) 
    Path-2 (++-)  -0.00006  0.00003  -0.00010  0.00009  -0.00007 
      (-0.07)  (0.19)  (-0.77)  (0.64)  (-0.34) 
    Path-3 (-++)  0.00089  0.00011  0.00015  0.00022  -0.00001 
      (0.44)  (0.71)  (1.04)  (1.37)  (-0.04) 
    Constant  0.00253  0.00242  0.00222  0.00227  0.00268 
      (2.83)  (6.20)  (5.84)  (5.76)  (6.29) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.00005  -0.00005  0.00013  0.00001 
        (-0.30)  (-0.32)  (0.75)  (0.04) 
    Path-6 (+--)  0.00042  -0.00008  -0.00004  0.00003  -0.00022 
      (0.56)  (-0.58)  (-0.32)  (0.19)  (-0.98) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.00021  -0.00006  0.00003  -0.00004 
        (-1.59)  (-0.49)  (0.26)  (-0.19) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.00025  -0.00028  -0.00008  -0.00017 
        (-1.98)  (-2.35)  (-0.65)  (-0.78) 
    Volatility  0.00010  0.00012  0.00007  0.00012  0.00017 
      (0.93)  (1.07)  (0.66)  (1.03)  (1.59) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.00023  -0.00024  -0.00023  -0.00024  -0.00017 
      (-3.61)  (-3.63)  (-3.61)  (-3.54)  (-2.58) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.00045  -0.00043  -0.00043  -0.00045  -0.00048 
      (-14.84)  (-14.26)  (-14.46)  (-14.43)  (-15.40) 
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Table 10. Account Flows Summary Statistics 
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Year  Total account flows        Within equity industry account flows       
  Obs  Mean  s  Min  Max  N  Mean  s  Min  Max  Positive  Negative 
1989  237  0.2437  0.7249  -0.8505  7.3995  170  0.3293  0.8403  -0.8505  7.3995  129  41 
1990  321  0.1056  0.7249  -1.0462  5.5311  210  0.1168  0.8535  -1.0462  5.5311  84  126 
1991  416  0.0931  0.7932  -0.9526  10.8599  214  0.1441  1.0509  -0.9526  10.8599  83  131 
1992  470  0.1804  1.0208  -1.0869  10.9105  276  0.2579  1.308  -1.0869  10.9105  130  146 
1993  528  0.0759  0.8826  -1.081  11.8008  225  0.0999  1.2076  -1.081  11.8008  75  150 
1994  669  0.1171  1.0279  -1.1271  12.9493  287  0.1125  1.4194  -1.1271  12.9493  98  189 
1995  740  0.1634  0.6693  -1.0072  8.9848  517  0.2162  0.7884  -1.0072  8.9848  300  217 
1996  724  -0.0716  0.6183  -1.2556  9.0327  256  -0.1706  0.8464  -1.2556  9.0327  59  197 
1997  699  0.4767  0.8953  -0.6987  12.2104  404  0.7457  1.0948  -0.6987  12.2104  391  13 
1998  997  0.0813  0.7182  -1.0656  12.0983  457  0.0542  0.9154  -1.0656  12.0983  185  272 
1999  1168  -0.0876  1.0816  -1.296  13.6923  500  -0.2378  1.2295  -1.296  13.1923  92  408 
Total  6969  0.1025  0.8785  -1.296  13.6923  3516  0.1458  1.1014  -1.296  13.1923  1626  1890 
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Table 11. Account Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of account flows – product i’s 
account gains or losses in year t relative to the average equity product -- on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Account Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Return i,t-t, Performance Consistencyi,t-t, Product Attributes i,t -1) 
 
A. Total and Excess Return Variables 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 
        S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0288  0.0527  0.0503  0.0503  0.0361 
    within-r
2  0.0662  0.0786  0.0768  0.0751  0.0724 
    Constant  1.82220  1.71148  1.69437  1.70868  1.70692 
      (17.08)  (16.79)  (16.48)  (16.34)  (16.41) 
Return  1-year  Return  0.02753  0.38307  0.13986  0.21476  -0.08745 
      (0.26)  (1.52)  (0.50)  (0.71)  (-0.38) 
    < 0 interaction  1.81901  0.75870  0.79891  0.92308  1.32900 
      (2.98)  (1.88)  (1.81)  (1.91)  (2.70) 
  3-year  Return  1.26304  0.54991  2.29599  1.48533  2.53747 
      (5.15)  (0.95)  (3.59)  (2.06)  (4.80) 
    < 0 interaction  -10.93906  -0.46487  -2.31510  -2.17711  -4.93826 
      (-0.80)  (-0.49)  (-2.31)  (-1.94)  (-4.36) 
  5-year  Return  -1.07049  1.90224  0.87088  1.86638  -0.16111 
      (-2.50)  (2.38)  (1.02)  (1.96)  (-0.23) 
    < 0 interaction    -0.52892  0.57170  0.38536  2.36268 
        (-0.44)  (0.44)  (0.26)  (1.58) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.06053  -0.15506  -0.15334  -0.16064  -0.09937 
      (-1.72)  (-4.43)  (-4.36)  (-4.49)  (-2.79) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.29786  -0.25891  -0.25997  -0.26253  -0.28669 
      (-18.02)  (-16.06)  (-16.11)  (-15.96)  (-17.45) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00461  -0.00513  -0.00495  -0.00480  -0.00553 
      (-1.88)  (-2.11)  (-2.03)  (-1.95)  (-2.24) 
 
B. Return Consistency Variables 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 
      Return  S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0221  0.0525  0.0498  0.0499  0.0298 
    within-r
2  0.0612  0.0748  0.0747  0.0731  0.0646 
Consistency     Path-1 (+++)  0.02667  0.09343  0.25380  0.20146  0.09292 
      (0.09)  (1.58)  (4.62)  (3.26)  (0.87) 
    Path-2 (++-)  -0.11932  -0.07686  0.04821  0.1633  -0.07660 
      (-0.40)  (-1.22)  (0.82)  (0.25)  (-0.70) 
    Path-3 (-++)  1.03752  -0.10112  0.06348  -0.057506  -0.03247 
      (1.09)  (-1.38)  (0.88)  (-0.72)  (-0.23) 
    Constant  1.52256  1.39265  1.21489  1.24065  1.53670 
      (4.36)  (6.90)  (6.02)  (5.99)  (6.83) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.18891  0.13097  -0.00605  -0.09286 
        (-2.13)  (1.74)  (-0.07)  (-0.60) 
    Path-6 (+--)  -0.02950  -0.11619  0.03905  0.00905  -0.05429 
      (-0.08)  (-1.77)  (0.63)  (0.13)  (-0.45) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.22577  -0.02197  -0.08675  -0.08699 
        (-3.28)  (-0.34)  (-1.22)  (-0.67) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.23175  -0.07463  -0.11802  -0.11638 
        (-3.92)  (-1.36)  (-1.88)  (-1.03) 
    Volatility  -0.10167  -0.15002  -0.15981  -0.17059  -0.07682 
      (-1.64)  (-2.45)  (-2.60)  (-2.73)  (-1.21) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.08587  -0.12004  -0.12529  -0.13136  -0.10120 
      (-2.45)  (-3.44)  (-3.57)  (-3.68)  (-2.84) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.28795  -0.26666  -0.26821  -0.26976  -0.28039 
      (-17.75)  (-16.44)  (-16.57)  (-16.34)  (-16.99) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00466  -0.00509  -0.00462  -0.00481  -0.00475 
      (-1.83)  (-2.09)  (-1.89)  (-1.95)  (-1.91)  
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Table 11. Account Flows Model (continued) 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of account flows – product i’s 
account gains or losses in year t relative to the average equity product -- on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Account Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Return i,t-t, Performance Consistencyi,t-t, Product Attributes i,t -1) 
 
C. Combined Consistency Path Variables 
Category  Variable    Style Excess Return Benchmark 
        Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0531  0.0566  0.0550  0.0535 
    within-r
2  0.0764  0.0817  0.0787  0.0772 
    Constant  1.51366  1.45114  1.43893  1.56275 
      (4.35)  (4.16)  (4.08)  (4.25) 
Total    Path-1 (+++)  -0.04117  -0.08585  -0.07470  -0.06003 
Return      (-0.14)  (-0.29)  (-0.25)  (-0.20) 
Consistency    Path-2 (++-)  -0.14285  -0.18258  -0.16855  -0.12058 
      (-0.48)  (-0.61)  (-0.56)  (-0.40) 
    Path-3 (-++)  1.01781  0.94679  0.98214  1.05166 
      (1.08)  (1.01)  (1.04)  (1.11) 
    Path-5 (-+-)         
             
    Path-6 (+--)  -0.04759  -0.07609  -0.04886  -0.04566 
      (-0.12)  (-0.20)  (-0.12)  (-0.11) 
    Path-7 (--+)         
             
    Path-8 (---)         
             
S&P 500     Path-1 (+++)  0.08926  -0.00604  0.02773  0.09222 
Excess      (1.50)  (-0.09)  (0.42)  (1.52) 
Return    Path-2 (++-)  -0.05364  -0.08013  -0.07300  -0.03961 
Consistency      (-0.84)  (-1.17)  (-1.02)  (-0.61) 
    Path-3 (-++)  -0.10392  -0.14456  -0.08278  -0.08850 
      (-1.41)  (-1.86)  (-1.02)  (-1.18) 
    Path-5 (-+-)  -0.16945  -0.22349  -0.15959  -0.14674 
      (-1.90)  (-2.39)  (-1.67)  (-1.62) 
    Path-6 (+--)  -0.10117  -0.10906  -0.09503  -0.08551 
      (-1.53)  (-1.54)  (-1.29)  (-1.27) 
    Path-7 (--+)  -0.22622  -0.22552  -0.19156  -0.22096 
      (-3.28)  (-3.14)  (-2.56)  (-3.14) 
    Path-8 (---)  -0.22218  -0.20854  -0.17315  -0.20134 
      (-3.74)  (-3.20)  (-2.50)  (-3.30) 
    Volatility  -0.13271  -0.14391  -0.15719  -0.13371 
      (-2.15)  (-2.33)  (-2.50)  (-2.09) 
Style     Path-1 (+++)    0.21179  0.14212  -0.01625 
Excess        (3.56)  (2.05)  (-0.15) 
Return    Path-2 (++-)    0.05973  0.04287  -0.10232 
Consistency        (0.93)  (0.58)  (-0.92) 
    Path-3 (-++)    0.09391  -0.02994  -0.07482 
        (1.23)  (-0.34)  (-0.53) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    0.20639  0.05824  -0.10750 
        (2.60)  (0.63)  (-0.69) 
    Path-6 (+--)    0.07815  0.05711  -0.04691 
        (1.17)  (0.75)  (-0.39) 
    Path-7 (--+)    0.05461  -0.00741  -0.07386 
        (0.81)  (-0.10)  (-0.57) 
    Path-8 (---)    0.02320  -0.01801  -0.05436 
        (0.38)  (-0.25)  (-0.48) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.11805  -0.12998  -0.13315  -0.12593 
      (-3.38)  (-3.71)  (-3.73)  (-3.54) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.27138  -0.26905  -0.27220  -0.27347 
      (-16.66)  (-16.53)  (-16.39)  (-16.45) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00521  -0.00510  -0.00510  -0.00501 
      (-2.06)  (-2.02)  (-2.00)  (-1.96)  
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Table 12. Account Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of account flows – product i’s 
account gains or losses in year t relative to the average equity product -- on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Account Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Return i,t-t, Performance Consistencyi,t-t, Product Attributes i,t -1) 
 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 
      Return  S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0285  0.0588  0.0556  0.0559  0.0376 
    within-r
2  0.0666  0.0824  0.0817  0.0795  0.0732 
Return  1-year  Return  -0.00155  0.26964  -0.05816  0.12194  -0.22772 
      (-0.01)  (0.96)  (-0.18)  (0.37)  (-0.92) 
    < 0 interaction  1.46811  0.87640  0.96648  1.03982  1.39143 
      (1.89)  (2.10)  (2.13)  (2.10)  (2.69) 
  3-year  Return  1.24151  0.09214  1.61461  0.84661  2.51355 
      (5.00)  (0.14)  (2.28)  (1.07)  (4.63) 
    < 0 interaction  0.28753  0.19236  -2.08302  -1.74211  -4.46935 
      (0.01)  (0.19)  (-2.00)  (-1.49)  (-3.77) 
  5-year  Return  -1.02876  1.38771  1.12649  1.58011  -0.17445 
      (-2.36)  (1.58)  (1.20)  (1.54)  (-0.24) 
    < 0 interaction    -0.28036  0.67295  0.47532  2.06596 
        (-0.23)  (0.51)  (0.32)  (1.34) 
Consistency    Path-1 (+++)  -0.16023  0.04613  0.17608  0.14620  -0.02525 
      (-0.36)  (0.71)  (2.91)  (2.19)  (-0.23) 
    Path-2 (++-)  -0.19717  -0.05746  0.03235  0.03233  -0.09331 
      (-0.45)  (-0.83)  (0.49)  (0.45)  (-0.82) 
    Path-3 (-++)  0.87270  -0.07560  0.07904  -0.02006  -0.04323 
      (0.87)  (-0.96)  (1.01)  (-0.24)  (-0.30) 
    Constant  1.86904  1.48635  1.16052  1.19560  1.65092 
      (3.89)  (7.02)  (5.49)  (5.56)  (7.31) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.09982  0.18915  0.08167  -0.05985 
        (-1.05)  (2.27)  (0.89)  (-0.37) 
    Path-6 (+--)  0.01311  -0.05384  0.08291  0.07118  -0.00365 
      (0.03)  (-0.79)  (1.28)  (0.99)  (-0.03) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.16935  0.02895  -0.04084  -0.07988 
        (-2.38)  (0.43)  (-0.56)  (-0.60) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.04631  0.06091  0.02332  -0.02473 
        (-0.70)  (0.97)  (0.34)  (-0.21) 
    Volatility  -0.04572  -0.10285  -0.16486  -0.16835  -0.03810 
      (-0.72)  (-1.61)  (-2.61)  (-2.63)  (-0.60) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.06035  -0.15027  -0.14682  -0.15240  -0.09701 
      (-1.71)  (-4.27)  (-4.16)  (-4.24)  (-2.71) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.29983  -0.26101  -0.26302  -0.26651  -0.28770 
      (-18.06)  (-16.10)  (-16.25)  (-16.06)  (-17.39) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00480  -0.00508  -0.00464  -0.00472  -0.00528 
      (-1.87)  (-2.09)  (-1.91)  (-1.92)  (-2.13) 
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Table 13. Account Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of account flows – product i’s 
account gains or losses in year t relative to the average equity product -- on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Account Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Return i,t-t, Performance Consistencyi,t-t, Product Attributes i,t -1) 
 
Category  Variable  Total  
Return 
Consistency, 
Excess Return Benchmark 
      S&P 500 
Excess 
S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0601  0.0651  0.0603  0.0623  0.0385 
    within-r
2  0.0891  0.0910  0.0871  0.0868  0.0775 
Return  1-year  Total Return  -0.23622  -0.14374  0.10970  0.06864  0.11737 
      (-1.78)  (-1.11)  (0.94)  (0.57)  (0.74) 
    < 0 interaction  0.71994  1.95862  1.47865  1.65086  1.56630 
      (0.91)  (3.07)  (2.37)  (2.54)  (2.28) 
    Excess Return  0.54298  0.34782  -0.34805  -0.18734  -0.39670 
      (1.84)  (1.07)  (-1.01)  (-0.51)  (-1.16) 
    < 0 interaction  0.06574  0.36755  0.80005  0.90562  1.11536 
      (0.15)  (0.84)  (1.72)  (1.76)  (2.01) 
  3-year  Total Return  2.03097  2.03566  1.26070  1.60536  1.03052 
      (6.57)  (6.57)  (4.54)  (5.61)  (2.83) 
    < 0 interaction  -1.37270  -12.34690  -12.38130  -13.42038  -2.44967 
      (-0.05)  (-0.91)  (-0.91)  (-0.98)  (-0.18) 
    Excess Return  -1.85645  -2.28774  0.50199  -0.86406  1.37565 
      (-2.71)  (-3.10)  (0.66)  (-1.00)  (1.78) 
    < 0 interaction  1.18932  1.88266  -0.88519  -0.10325  -3.22830 
      (1.21)  (1.84)  (-0.83)  (-0.09)  (-2.54) 
  5-year  Total Return  -3.11462  -2.98824  -2.33158  -2.71237  -2.64620 
      (-5.53)  (-5.35)  (-4.49)  (-5.09)  (-4.50) 
    Excess Return  5.93552  4.90705  3.50329  4.71169  2.39663 
      (6.05)  (4.76)  (3.35)  (4.11)  (2.53) 
    < 0 interaction  -2.50907  -2.10978  -0.89911  -1.76456  0.40306 
      (-2.02)  (-1.68)  (-0.67)  (-1.17)  (0.25) 
Consistency    Path-1 (+++)  -0.06420  0.05404  0.18696  0.15718  -0.02176 
      (-0.15)  (0.83)  (3.08)  (2.35)  (-0.20) 
    Path-2 (++-)  -0.21051  -0.04692  0.05140  0.05469  -0.07213 
      (-0.48)  (-0.68)  (0.77)  (0.76)  (-0.64) 
    Path-3 (-++)  1.11098  -0.08844  0.08858  -0.01011  -0.29501 
      (1.12)  (-1.13)  (1.13)  (-0.12)  (-0.21) 
    Constant  1.84287  1.85263  1.47751  1.55775  1.97816 
      (3.82)  (8.39)  (6.72)  (6.96)  (8.37) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.10773  0.20318  0.10618  -0.04576 
        (-1.13)  (2.42)  (1.15)  (-0.29) 
    Path-6 (+--)  0.04587  -0.05407  0.08839  0.08038  0.03495 
      (0.12)  (-0.80)  (1.35)  (1.11)  (0.28) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.17503  0.04363  -0.03877  -0.06685 
        (-2.47)  (0.65)  (-0.53)  (-0.51) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.05078  0.07302  0.03996  0.01820 
        (-0.76)  (1.15)  (0.58)  (0.15) 
    Volatility  -0.06799  -0.04411  -0.10283  -0.09842  0.02650 
      (-1.05)  (-0.68)  (-1.59)  (-1.50)  (0.41) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.11491  -0.11177  -0.12280  -0.12312  -0.08367 
      (-3.23)  (-3.13)  (-3.44)  (-3.39)  (-2.32) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.27409  -0.27283  -0.27283  -0.27314  -0.28506 
      (-16.34)  (-16.28)  (-16.28)  (-15.95)  (-16.63) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00538  -0.00533  -0.00533  -0.00487  -0.00505 
      (-2.12)  (-2.19)  (-2.19)  (-1.98)  (-2.04) 
  
50 
Table 14. Account Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of account flows – product i’s 
account gains or losses in year t relative to the average equity product -- on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Account Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Return i,t-t, Performance Consistencyi,t-t, Product Attributes i,t -1) 
 
A. Total and Excess Return Variables 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 
        S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0393  0.0827  0.0798  0.0770  0.0580 
    within-r
2  0.1053  0.1191  0.1170  0.1168  0.1149 
    Constant  3.19285  2.89437  2.86865  2.89110  2.94366 
      (15.39)  (14.55)  (14.17)  (14.27)  (14.62) 
Return  1-year  Return  0.24068  0.44755  0.08830  0.49131  0.14322 
      (1.17)  (0.93)  (0.16)  (0.85)  (0.32) 
    < 0 interaction  1.80243  1.29058  1.32916  1.15709  2.03271 
      (1.75)  (1.69)  (1.53)  (1.25)  (2.17) 
  3-year  Return  1.59128  0.83288  3.73860  2.26768  3.41400 
      (3.36)  (0.75)  (3.05)  (1.65)  (3.33) 
    < 0 interaction  -15.89945  -0.71922  -3.52251  -3.17128  -7.12576 
      (-0.74)  (-0.39)  (-1.78)  (-1.45)  (-3.33) 
  5-year  Return  -2.00892  2.69687  0.40650  1.97328  -0.23669 
      (-2.48)  (1.75)  (0.24)  (1.07)  (-0.18) 
    < 0 interaction    -1.75916  0.82399  0.55992  1.29907 
        (-0.76)  (0.33)  (0.20)  (0.47) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.09768  -0.19526  -0.18625  -0.20185  -0.13118 
      (-1.48)  (-3.00)  (-2.85)  (-3.06)  (-1.99) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.49783  -0.43884  -0.43862  -0.44255  -0.48413 
      (-15.53)  (-14.12)  (-14.04)  (-14.10)  (-15.50) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00452  -0.00507  -0.00473  -0.00479  -0.00577 
      (-1.46)  (-1.66)  (-1.54)  (-1.56)  (-1.87) 
 
B. Return Consistency Variables 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 
      Return  S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0328
  0.0881  0.0788  0.0772  0.0460 
    within-r
2  0.0993  0.1145  0.1139  0.1099  0.1038 
Consistency     Path-1 (+++)  0.04284  0.05537  0.27522  0.18464  -0.00162 
      (0.10)  (0.51)  (2.91)  (1.69)  (-0.01) 
    Path-2 (++-)  -0.13220  -0.18446  0.00422  -0.02020  -0.25522 
      (-0.30)  (-1.62)  (0.04)  (-0.17)  (-1.28) 
    Path-3 (-++)  2.08664  -0.22962  0.02307  -0.16060  -0.16320 
      (1.55)  (-1.68)  (0.17)  (-1.10)  (-0.63) 
    Constant  2.85806  2.72407  2.45021  2.53453  2.99387 
      (5.11)  (7.24)  (6.53)  (6.64)  (7.27) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.25622  0.31782  -0.00769  -0.29189 
        (-1.58)  (2.31)  (-0.05)  (-0.99) 
    Path-6 (+--)  -0.13893  -0.24684  0.00940  -0.04698  -0.17496 
      (-0.24)  (-2.06)  (0.09)  (-0.38)  (-0.81) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.35687  -0.05140  -0.14341  -0.18842 
        (-2.81)  (-0.45)  (-1.13)  (-0.80) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.36893  -0.12045  -0.18682  -0.19150 
        (-3.46)  (-1.28)  (-1.70)  (-0.94) 
    Volatility  -0.07584  -0.12792  -0.14796  -0.15852  -0.05032 
      (-0.66)  (-1.14)  (-1.31)  (-1.39)  (-0.43) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.13060  -0.15701  -0.16810  -0.17126  -0.14111 
      (-2.00)  (-2.41)  (-2.57)  (-2.59)  (-2.14) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.48203  -0.44421  -0.44940  -0.45448  -0.47483 
      (-15.42)  (-14.18)  (-14.35)  (-14.38)  (-15.10) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00473  -0.00534  -0.00468  -0.00500  -0.00476 
      (-1.46)  (-1.74)  (-1.52)  (-1.62)  (-1.53)  
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Table 15. Account Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of account flows – product i’s 
account gains or losses in year t relative to the average equity product -- on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style ex posure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Account Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Return i,t-t, Performance Consistencyi,t-t, Product Attributes i,t -1) 
 
Category  Variable  Total  Excess Return Benchmark 
      Return  S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0403
  0.0954  0.0887  0.0863  0.0580 
    within-r
2  0.1064  0.1232  0.1229  0.1197  0.1166 
Return  1-year  Return  0.24209  0.26918  -0.06766  0.61702  0.04651 
      (1.12)  (0.50)  (-0.10)  (0.96)  (0.10) 
    < 0 interaction  1.76019  1.50817  1.62522  1.33691  2.31171 
      (1.38)  (1.92)  (1.82)  (1.42)  (2.34) 
  3-year  Return  1.59899  0.32468  2.99752  1.91938  3.54352 
      (3.32)  (0.26)  (2.21)  (1.27)  (3.37) 
    < 0 interaction  -16.15959  0.30360  -3.68456  -2.65957  -6.12620 
      (-0.41)  (0.16)  (-1.80)  (-1.16)  (-2.68) 
  5-year  Return  -1.95211  1.56649  1.04220  1.04815  -0.15716 
      (-2.38)  (0.92)  (0.57)  (0.52)  (-0.11) 
    < 0 interaction    -1.27976  0.66553  0.70147  0.29732 
        (-0.54)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.10) 
Consistency    Path-1 (+++)  -0.04894  -0.00377  0.14919  0.08574  -0.16227 
      (-0.08)  (-0.03)  (1.40)  (0.72)  (-0.82) 
    Path-2 (++-)  -0.04875  -0.14996  -0.017924  0.02165  -0.21811 
      (-0.08)  (-1.18)  (-0.15)  (0.17)  (-1.06) 
    Path-3 (-++)  2.04286  -0.20993  0.01633  -0.14933  -0.18548 
      (1.44)  (-1.42)  (0.11)  (-0.96)  (-0.69) 
    Constant  3.27451  2.89384  2.40237  2.52899  3.1497 
      (4.41)  (7.36)  (6.10)  (6.40)  (7.63) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.16064  0.38010  0.09286  -0.22869 
        (-0.92)  (2.46)  (0.52)  (-0.75) 
    Path-6 (+--)  -0.08993  -0.14341  0.08809  0.074325  -0.03020 
      (-0.15)  (-1.15)  (0.76)  (0.58)  (-0.14) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.29024  -0.00317  -0.10032  -0.23335 
        (-2.19)  (-0.03)  (-0.76)  (-0.97) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.12842  0.05624  0.02504  -0.04902 
        (-1.06)  (0.51)  (0.20)  (-0.23) 
    Volatility  0.00774  -0.04804  -0.14060  -0.13158  0.01193 
      (0.07)  (-0.41)  (-1.22)  (-1.13)  (0.10) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.10247  -0.19490  -0.18275  -0.19677  -0.13194 
      (-1.55)  (-2.97)  (-2.78)  (-2.97)  (-1.99) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.50126  -0.43685  -0.44070  -0.44640  -0.48666 
      (-15.57)  (-13.95)  (-14.04)  (-14.14)  (-15.49) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00463  -0.00520  -0.00458  -0.00481  -0.00524 
      (-1.41)  (-1.70)  (-1.49)  (-1.56)  (-1.69) 
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Table 16. Account Flows Model 
This table reports coefficient estimates using fixed effects least squares regression of account flows – product i’s 
account gains or losses in year t relative to the average equity product -- on performance, consistency, and product 
attributes.  Excess returns are calculated using the S&P500, the products’ 2000 self-reported style, style indicator, 
and style exposure.  The sample is all equity products with 5-year lagged returns over the period to be 1989-2000 
excluding “Index-Passive”, “Global”, and “Smallcap” products.  Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold 
and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Account Flowsi,t ~ ƒ(St Return i,t-t, Performance Consistencyi,t-t, Product Attributes i,t -1) 
 
Category  Variable  Total 
Return 
Consistency, 
Excess Return Benchmark 
      S&P 500 
Excess 
S&P 500  Self-Reported  Style Indicator  Style Exposure 
    adjusted-r
2  0.0925  0.1017  0.0933  0.0923  0.0577 
    within-r
2  0.1299  0.1318  0.1288  0.1275  0.1219 
Return  1-year  Total Return  0.01795  0.13671  0.43343  0.34735  0.30954 
      (0.07)  (0.54)  (1.89)  (1.48)  (1.01) 
    < 0 interaction  0.26961  1.46816  0.82257  1.09395  1.49612 
      (0.21)  (1.34)  (0.77)  (1.00)  (1.29) 
    Excess Return  0.30826  0.01848  -0.74733  -0.04888  -0.35078 
      (0.54)  (0.03)  (-1.07)  (-0.07)  (-0.52) 
    < 0 interaction  0.55424  0.93584  1.58734  1.34513  2.03782 
      (0.66)  (1.11)  (1.72)  (1.35)  (1.91) 
  3-year  Total Return  2.67366  2.61486  1.4174  1.94529  1.27915 
      (4.42)  (4.32)  (2.65)  (3.55)  (1.87) 
    < 0 interaction  -8.33372  -17.67396  -18.34725  -19.85043  -8.43875 
      (-0.21)  (-0.82)  (-0.86)  (-0.92)  (-0.38) 
    Excess Return  -2.13837  -2.49654  1.83140  -0.08422  2.21568 
      (-1.63)  (-1.77)  (1.26)  (-0.05)  (1.53) 
    < 0 interaction  1.50380  2.39397  -2.18932  -0.44891  -4.64737 
      (0.78)  (1.19)  (-1.04)  (-0.19)  (-1.91) 
  5-year  Total Return  -4.34046  -4.12101  -2.97426  -3.64783  -3.93750 
      (-4.07)  (-3.89)  (-3.09)  (-3.70)  (-3.59) 
    Excess Return  7.58186  5.91784  3.83300  5.07017  3.48412 
      (4.08)  (3.01)  (1.90)  (2.28)  (1.93) 
    < 0 interaction  -3.54133  -3.07645  -1.08683  -2.28511  -1.82447 
      (-1.49)  (-1.28)  (-0.42)  (-0.79)  (-0.61) 
Consistency    Path-1 (+++)  -0.04287  0.00593  0.14131  0.08311  -0.14512 
      (-0.07)  (0.05)  (1.33)  (0.70)  (-0.73) 
    Path-2 (++-)  -0.20183  -0.13596  -0.017261  0.036881  -0.18603 
      (-0.31)  (-1.07)  (-0.14)  (0.28)  (-0.90) 
    Path-3 (-++)  2.17752  -0.22997  0.00859  -0.14668  -0.17601 
      (1.54)  (-1.56)  (0.06)  (-0.94)  (-0.66) 
    Constant  3.40250  3.47188  2.87649  3.06642  3.58460 
      (4.51)  (8.41)  (6.99)  (7.42)  (8.35) 
    Path-5 (-+-)    -0.173834  0.37240  0.11349  -0.20863 
        (-0.99)  (2.40)  (0.64)  (-0.68) 
    Path-6 (+--)  0.00682  -0.15080  0.07173  0.07635  0.03357 
      (0.01)  (-1.21)  (0.61)  (0.59)  (0.15) 
    Path-7 (--+)    -0.28529  -0.00158  -0.10688  -0.20458 
        (-2.16)  (-0.01)  (-0.81)  (-0.85) 
    Path-8 (---)    -0.14122  0.04044  0.03632  0.03704 
        (-1.16)  (0.36)  (0.30)  (0.17) 
    Volatility  0.02350  0.04214  -0.05158  -0.03398  0.09368 
      (0.20)  (0.35)  (-0.44)  (-0.28)  (0.79) 
Attributes    Age £ 10  -0.15225  -0.14785  -0.16263  -0.16487  -0.11443 
      (-2.30)  (-2.23)  (-2.45)  (-2.46)  (-1.71) 
    ln(Assets)  -0.46906  -0.46388  -0.45235  -0.46262  -0.48111 
      (-14.37)  (-14.23)  (-13.86)  (-14.07)  (-14.69) 
    Lagged Account flows  -0.00512  -0.00527  -0.00455  -0.00480  -0.00490 




Figure 1. Distribution of Simple Style Measures 
This table reports the distribution of style indicators over the sample period categorized by the product’s 2000 self-
reported style.  Product i is designated as growth (value), and assigned an indicator of 0 (1), if its estimated 
sensitivity to the Russell 1000 Growth (Value) index, bG,i,t (bV,i,t), using bivariate regressions for the 6-year period t 
is significant.  Products where both coefficients are significant are assigned a style indicator calculated as: 
 
Stylei,t = 
t i, G, t i, V,
, ,





t i V  
 
 Products with less than 20 quarterly return observations or an adjusted-r














































































































































































Figure 2. Assets Flows 
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Figure 3. Net Flows v. Excess Returns 
This figure plots the annual net asset flows for all equity products in the test sample versus 1-year excess returns 
relative to the S&P 500 and the product’s self-reported style index, the Russell 1000 Value and Growth 1000 indices 
for value and growth products respectively.  Flows are reported in millions of dollars. 
 
A. 1-Year Return 
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